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INTRODUCTION
Security is a relationship between collateral and monetary obligations. The essence of the relationship is that if the obligations are not
paid, the collateral may be sold and the sale proceeds applied to pay
the obligations. The security concept is embodied in mortgages,
security interests, and liens.
Security enjoys a highly privileged position in American law. A
simple-sentence grant of a security interest,1 combined with the filing
of notice in an obscure set of public records, will give the secured
creditor’s claim priority over employees’ wage claims,2 child support
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1 4 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 31-2
(6th ed. 2010) (“[I]t is enough for the debtor to write on the back of an envelope, ‘I
hereby grant bank a security interest in my cattle, John Jones.’ ”).
2 E.g., First Nat’l Bank of Ind. v. Gabonay, 545 N.E.2d 1130, 1133 (Ind. Ct. App.
1989) (“The Bank’s security interest in the corporation’s personal property was perfected long before the three months preceding the corporation’s demise when the
employees’ claim for unpaid wages accrued.”).
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obligations,3 tax claims,4 civil damage judgments,5 criminal fines and
forfeitures,6 claims for unjust enrichment,7 and just about any other
kind of debt imaginable.8
Scholars have attempted to justify security on both contract and
property theories. On the American side, Dean David Leebron best
articulated the contract argument:
The priority claim of a secured creditor rests almost entirely on
principles of contract and notice. A persuasive theory of secured
credit financing has been elusive, but the priority of a secured creditor over other financial creditors can be justified on the grounds
that non-secured creditors grant a loan knowing that some assets
are subject to security interests or could be subjected to security
interests without their permission. If particular creditors will not
tolerate other creditors having security interests in the borrower’s
assets, they can refuse to make a loan or make it only if the borrower agrees not to subject its assets to any security interests.9
3 E.g., Les Realty Corp. v. Hogan, 714 A.2d 366, 370 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1998) (“[C]hild support judgments are not given any special treatment in so far as
priority of liens and are therefore subject to the general rule of ‘first in time, first in
right.’ ”).
4 E.g., United States v. McDermott, 507 U.S. 447, 449 (1993) (“Federal tax liens
do not automatically have priority over all other liens. Absent provision to the contrary, priority for purposes of federal law is governed by the common-law principle
that ‘the first in time is the first in right.’ ” (citation omitted)).
5 E.g., Bank Leumi Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Liggett, 496 N.Y.S.2d 14, 16 (App. Div.
1985) (stating that “[i]t has long been established that first in time priority obtains as
between mortgages and judgments,” and awarding priority to mortgage over judgment for fraudulent transfer).
6 E.g., People v. Green, 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 736, 738 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a
criminal defendant’s attorney’s security interest for attorneys’ fees had priority over
the state’s claim pursuant to California’s “Freeze-and-Seize Law”).
7 E.g., Ninth Dist. Prod. Credit Ass’n v. Ed Duggan, Inc., 821 P.2d 788, 797
(Colo. 1991) (“The UCC priority system thus reflects the legislative judgment that the
value of a predictable system of priorities ordinarily outweighs the disadvantage of the
system’s occasional inequities.”).
8 The principal exception is that property tax liens have priority over earlierperfected security interests and mortgages. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 29.45.300(b) (2012)
(“Property taxes, together with penalty and interest, are a lien upon the property
assessed, and the lien is prior and paramount to all other liens or encumbrances
against the property.”).
9 David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 1565, 1646 (1991). On the English side, Gerard McCormack stated:
The question arises why the law should permit the taking of security. Three
justifications are usually offered.
The first reason is based on freedom of contract: security is seen as resenting
a fair exchange for the loan. In other words, the secured creditor has bar-
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Contract cannot, however, justify security because security agreements “[are] effective according to [their] terms . . . against purchasers of the collateral, and against creditors.”10 That includes
purchasers and creditors who did not consent to the security agreement, had no way of knowing of its existence, or never chose to
become creditors at all.11 Agreement is the essence of contract, but
the affected purchasers and creditors have not agreed. As Professors
Lynn LoPucki and Elizabeth Warren put it, “[s]ecurity is an agreement between A and B that C take nothing.”12
Other scholars attempt to justify security on property theories.
For example, Professors Stephen Harris and Charles Mooney argued:
It seems clear enough that security interests, under Article 9 and
real estate law alike, are interests in property. The legal regime for
security interests reflects property law functionally as well as doctrinally. We believe it follows that the law should honor the transfer or
retention of security interests on the same normative grounds on
which it respects the alienation of property generally.13

The property theory begins from the generally accepted premise
that a building owner can, by conveying the building in an otherwise
unobjectionable transaction, cut off the rights of the debtor’s creditors to the building. By analogy, the property theory holds that by
conveying the first $100,000 of the value of the building in return for
a $100,000 loan, the owner should be able to cut off the rights of the
debtor’s other creditors to the first $100,000 of the value of the building. Frequent American literature references to security interests as

gained for rights of a proprietary nature over the debtor’s property whereas
the general creditors have not.
GERARD MCCORMACK, SECURED CREDIT UNDER ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW 12 (2004).
10 U.C.C. § 9-201(a) (2012).
11 See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Essay, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World,
92 MICH. L. REV. 336, 354 (1993) (“Because involuntary creditors, such as tort victims
and environmental cleanup funds, were unable to negotiate in advance for the kind
of superior treatment at state law that secured creditors demanded, they would likely
come into the claims process only after others had taken the most valuable assets.”).
12 LYNN M. LOPUCKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT, at xxxi (7th
ed.2012).
13 Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of Security
Interests: Taking Debtors’ Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV. 2021, 2051 (1994) (footnotes
omitted).
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“property”14 and English literature references to charges as “proprietary”15 are invocations of this theory.
A necessary implication of the property conveyance theory is that
encumbered property has multiple owners. The secured creditor
owns the value of the collateral up to the full amount of the debt. The
debtor owns the value of the collateral in excess of the amount of the
debt, the right to redeem the property by paying the debt,16 and the
right to use the property in the interim.
The principal policy objections to security are that it is deceptive17 (the “Deception Problem”) and that it distorts incentives for the
management of property (the “Incentives Problem”). The essence of
the Deception Problem is that debtors who have granted security
interests appear to have wealth, but do not. The effect is to deceive
third parties who extend credit without knowledge of the pre-existing
security. The problem is generally referred to as “ostensible ownership” in the United States18 and as “false wealth” in England.19
14 See, e.g., Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, Having One’s Property
and Eating It Too: When the Article 9 Security Interest Becomes a Nuisance, 82 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 373, 374–75 (2006) (arguing that, under reigning conceptualization of security interest as property, “secured parties are figures of privilege among all creditors,
enjoying a pervasive ‘property priority’ under state law and even in bankruptcy.”).
15 See, e.g., Louise Gullifer & Jennifer Payne, The Characterization of Fixed and Floating Charges, in COMPANY CHARGES: SPECTRUM AND BEYOND 51, 56 (Joshua Getzler &
Jennifer Payne eds., 2006) (discussing three different theories that have been put
forward regarding whether a floating lien is “proprietary”).
16 See U.C.C. § 9-623 (2012) (granting to debtors the right to redeem collateral by
paying the debt at any time prior to the secured party’s disposition of the collateral).
17 See Jonathan C. Lipson, Secrets and Liens: The End of Notice in Commercial Finance
Law, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 421, 426 (2005) (“Article 9 of the UCC . . . appears
increasingly tolerant of secret liens.” (footnote omitted)); Lynn M. LoPucki, The
Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1891 (1994) (“[T]he deceptive nature
of security enables secured creditors and debtors to extract a . . . subsidy from relatively uninformed unsecured creditors who predictably miscalculate their likelihoods
of recovery.”); Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Collateralizing Intellectual Property, 42 GA. L. REV. 1,
29 (2007) (“The concept of secured financing with intellectual property assets is
deceptively simple . . . .”).
18 See Transp. Equip. Co. v. Guar. State Bank, 518 F.2d 377, 381 (10th Cir. 1975)
(“The ostensible ownership exercised through possession is demonstrated through
simple physical control. One who controls the collateral possesses it, and leads others
to believe it is his.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting In re Automated Bookbinding Servs.,
Inc., 471 F.2d 546, 552 (4th Cir. 1972) (“Exercise of . . . ostensible ownership could
perpetrate fraud on potential creditors who, not being able to know of the creditor’s
security interest, would think the collateral belonged to the debtor.”))).
19 See, e.g., LAW COMMISSION, REGISTRATION OF SECURITY INTERESTS, CONSULTATION
PAPER NO. 164 ¶ 1.9 (2002), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/lawcommission/
docs/cp164_Company_Security_Interests_Consultation.pdf (“The risk of the impres-
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The Incentives Problem is most egregious and easiest to see when
the amount of the secured debt equals or exceeds the value of the
collateral. Consider, for example, a business that operates with one
billion dollars in assets encumbered by one billion dollars in secured
debt. As the property’s owner, the debtor has the right to control its
use. The debtor can engage in business activities that risk inflicting
billions of dollars in damages on third parties.20 Those third parties
have no remedy against the debtor, because the debtor owns no part
of the value of its own assets.21 They have no remedy against the
secured party because the secured party—switching its metaphorical
role from “owner” to “creditor”—has priority over them.22 By shielding the debtor’s property from the valid claims of third parties, security renders both “owners” judgment-proof23 and encourages the
irresponsible management of wealth.24
Through a functional comparison of English and American
security interests, this Article identifies potential practical solutions to
sion of ‘false wealth’ and the lack of a means whereby the existence of non-possessory
secured lending could be discovered resulted in the introduction of the requirement
to register the existence of many non-possessory securities, whether created by companies or by individuals.”).
20 Prominent recent examples of such liability-producing activities were the BPDeepwater Horizon oil spill and the securitization of mortgage debt that precipitated
the financial panic of 2008.
21 See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 14–19 (1996)
(explaining the strategy of judgment proofing through secured debt).
22 The UCC provides that “[t]he existence of a security interest, agricultural lien,
or authority given to a debtor to dispose of or use collateral, without more, does not
subject a secured party to liability in contract or tort for the debtor’s acts or omissions.” U.C.C. § 9-402 (2012).
23 See generally Lynn M. LoPucki, The Essential Structure of Judgment Proofing, 51
STAN. L. REV. 147 (1998) (arguing that current law allows businesses, especially large
businesses, to successfully judgment-proof); S. Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 45 (1986) (using a theoretical model of accidents to explore
the problem of judgment proofing).
24 See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REV.
795, 843–52 (2004) (explaining the secured creditor’s disincentive to maximize value
for the benefit of other claimants).
This inefficiency can be mitigated in a variety of ways. The government can require
the purchase of insurance. LoPucki, supra note 21, at 71–88. The government can
impose criminal liability on individuals for the irresponsible managers and imprison
them. The irresponsible management may happen to affect the value of the collateral, giving the secured party some incentive to prevent it. The secured debt may be
less than the full value of the collateral, leaving the debtor with an equity to be concerned about. These potential mitigants are, however, rarely capable of overcoming
the fundamental inefficiency of secured credit. The judgment-proofing tendency of
secured credit virtually always distorts incentives to some degree.
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the Deception and Incentives Problems. The proof that these solutions can potentially work in one country is that they appear already to
be working, in similar circumstances, in the other.
The challenge was to distinguish these potential solutions from
the hundreds of differences that exist in legal doctrines and concepts
between English and American security interests. We accomplished
that by conducting our comparison at the functional rather than the
doctrinal level. Put simply, we focused on the resolutions of particular
problems in the two systems. We treated the systems as the same if
they reach the same resolutions—what LoPucki and Weyrauch have
referred to as “delivered law”—regardless of the paths by which they
arrived at them.25 To the extent that terminology differed between
the two systems, we posed the problems and resolutions in a neutral
language, which we constructed as needed. This method is well-recognized in the field of comparative law.26
Functional comparison dramatically reduces the apparent level of
difference between two legal systems.27 The explanation for this previously recognized phenomenon is beyond the scope of this Article.
25 Lynn M. LoPucki & Walter O. Weyrauch, A Theory of Legal Strategy, 49 DUKE L.J.
1405, 1430 (2000) (“Delivered law is the pattern of outcomes the legal system
delivers.”).
26 Zweigert and Kötz explain the starting point for our approach:
The basic methodological principle of all comparative law is that of functionality. . . . Incomparables cannot usefully be compared, and in law the only
things which are comparable are those which fulfill the same function. . . .
The proposition rests on what every comparatist learns, namely that the legal
system of every society faces essentially the same problems, and solves these
problems by quite different means though very often with similar results.
The question to which any comparative study is devoted must be posed in
purely functional terms; the problem must be stated without any reference
to the concepts of one’s own legal system.
KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 34 (3d ed.
1998). See generally Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV.
479, 514-16 (1997) (describing the application of this approach to a comparison of
U.S. and Canadian reorganization).
27 See Lynn M. LoPucki & George G. Triantis, A Systems Approach to Comparing U.S.
and Canadian Reorganization of Financially Distressed Companies, 35 HARV. INT’L L.J. 267,
269 (1994) (reporting “striking similarities in function” between the U.S. and Canadian reorganization regimes). Zweigert and Kötz state:
[T]he comparatist can rest content if his researches through all the relevant
material lead to the conclusion that the systems he has compared reach the
same or similar practical results, but if he finds that there are great differences or indeed diametrically opposite results, he should be warned and go
back to check again whether the terms in which he posed his original question were indeed purely functional . . . .
ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 26, at 40.
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In our comparison of English and American security interests, the
effect was to demonstrate that the systems are operating almost
identically.
The few functional differences that remain are each true policy
alternatives. We know that each is likely capable of transplant to the
other system, because each is already operating in an otherwise
almost-identical system.
Of the seven functional differences we identify, the most important addresses the Incentives Problem. In the American system, security interests have priority over virtually all competitors. In the English
system, a “carve-out” gives administrative expenses, preferential creditors, and an unsecured creditor “prescribed share” priority over security interests.
Three other differences address the Deception Problem. Both
the English and American systems generate secret liens, but they do so
in different ways and with respect to different collateral. The English
system is company-based while the American system is name-based.
The English system supplies more information, and to a wider audience. The three remaining differences are of only minor importance.
We do not claim to have shown that the devices identified solve
the underlying problems, even in the countries in which they are currently in use. Our claim is that they are potential solutions because
they are purported to have mitigated those problems.
We also make two other claims. First, our comparison is the most
extensive point-by-point comparison of the English and American law
governing secured transactions to date.28 Second, the extraordinary
level of similarity we observed at the functional level suggests that lawmaking is in most instances better described as a search for the only
solution that will work, than as a process of choosing among alternative policy solutions.
Both the English and American security systems recognize a wide
variety of security devices.29 To render our subject manageable, we
28 MCCORMACK, supra note 9, discusses both English and American secured transactions law, but does so in largely separate essays. There is little point-by-point comparison. The same is true of Nick Segal, The Effect of Reorganization Proceedings on
Security Interest: The Position Under English and U.S. Law, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 927
(2007). Both describe the English and American legal regimes, but neither attempts
to explain what is the same or different about them.
29 English law recognizes mortgages, pledges, contractual liens, and equitable
charges (fixed or floating). See ROYSTON MILES GOODE, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CREDIT
AND SECURITY 5 (3rd ed. 2003). American law recognizes a variety of security interests
that have been excluded from Article 9 coverage, including security interests in insurance, noncommercial tort claims, and compensation of employees. U.C.C. § 9109(d)(3), (8), (12) (2012).
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confine consideration in this Article to the principal forms of security
granted by companies. In the American system, that is the Uniform
Commercial Code Article 9 security interest with respect to personal
property and the mortgage with respect to real property. In the
English system, that is the fixed and floating charge, either of which
can—in theory at least—extend to both real and personal property.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I compares the English
and American systems with respect to attachment, perfection, and
enforcement of security interests. Part II explains the distinction
between fixed and floating charges under English law. Part III compares American security interests with English fixed charges by comparing the outcomes in prototypical cases. Part IV compares
American floating liens with English floating charges in the same
manner. The final Part concludes that the Americans should consider
adopting the English Carve-out, the English should consider adopting
the American cramdown, and both should consider improvements to
their security interest registration systems.
I. SYSTEMS COMPARED GENERALLY
English fixed and floating charges are created, perfected, prioritized, and enforced in essentially the same manner as American security interests.
A. Attachment
In both the English and American systems, debtors and creditors
create security interests by contract. In both, the creation is referred
to as “attachment.” The conditions necessary for security interests to
attach in the two systems are almost identical. To illustrate:
Goode describes four conditions which are necessary in order for
an interest to attach: (1) there must be an agreement between
debtor and creditor that the interest shall attach; (2) the asset must
be identifiable as falling within the scope of the agreement; (3) the
debtor must have a present interest in the asset, or power to give the
asset as security; and (4) there must be some current obligation of
debtor to creditor which the asset is designed to secure.30

Each of these four conditions for attachment is clearly visible in
the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code that define
attachment:
§ 9-203(a). A security interest attaches to collateral when it becomes
enforceable against the debtor with respect to the collateral . . . .
30 LAW COMMISSION, supra note 19, ¶ 2.5 n.10.
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(b) . . . [A] security interest is enforceable against the
debtor and third parties with respect to the collateral only if:
(1) value has been given;
(2) the debtor has rights in the collateral or the
power to transfer rights in the collateral to a secured party;
and
(3) one of the following conditions is met:
(A) the debtor has authenticated a security
agreement that provides a description of the
collateral . . . .31

The English requirement of an agreement is matched in the UCC
§ 9-203(b)(3) requirement of an authenticated security agreement. If
the collateral is land, both systems require that the agreement be the
equivalent of a writing.32 For other collateral, the American system
requires a writing or tangible equivalent,33 while the English system
does not.34 But in both countries, security agreements are nearly
always in writing to meet registration requirements or for evidentiary
reasons, making the difference of little commercial importance.
The English requirement that “the asset must be identifiable as
falling within the scope of the agreement”35 is matched by the American requirement that the security agreement “provides a description
of the collateral”36 that “reasonably identifies what is described.”37
The English requirement that the debtor “have a present interest in
the asset, or power to give the asset as security”38 is matched by the
American requirement that “the debtor has rights in the collateral or
the power to transfer rights in the collateral to a secured party.”39
Lastly, the English requirement that there be “some current obligation of debtor to creditor which the asset is designed to secure”40 is
31 U.C.C. § 9-203(a)–(b)(3)(A) (2012).
32 Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1989, c. 34, § 2(1) (“A contract for the sale or other disposition of an interest in land can only be made in
writing . . . .”); id. § 2(6) (“In this section . . . ‘interest in land’ means any estate,
interest or charge in or over land . . . .”).
33 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(7) (2012) (defining “authenticate”).
34 ROY GOODE, GOODE ON COMMERCIAL LAW 671 (Ewan McKendrick ed., 4th ed.
2010) (“[I]f the intended security interest is an interest in land, it must be made in
writing and signed by or on behalf of both parties . . . .”); LAW COMMISSION, COMPANY
SECURITY INTERESTS, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 176, ¶ 3.76 (“Present law does not
require writing for every kind of non-possessory security agreement.”).
35 LAW COMMISSION, supra note 19, ¶ 2.5 n.10.
36 U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3)(A) (2012).
37 Id. § 9-108(a).
38 LAW COMMISSION, supra note 19, ¶ 2.5 n.10.
39 U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(2) (2012).
40 LAW COMMISSION, supra note 19, ¶ 2.5 n.10.
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matched by the American requirement that “value has been given.”41
Although the American statute does not say who must give value “the
assumption seems to be that it is the creditor.”42 Typically, that value
will be the loan.
One apparent difference between the English and American systems is that the English system permits the taking of floating charges
against “the undertaking,” that is, the business of the debtor.43 The
American system permits only the taking of security interests in specific property, or specific categories of property.44 A description of
the collateral as “all of the debtor’s assets” or words of similar import,
is insufficient.45 The difference may, however, merely be cosmetic.
American lawyers combine all possible categories of property to create
descriptions that cover all property of the debtor that can serve as
collateral. Such descriptions are upheld.46
B. Perfection
The legitimacy of secured creditor priority ultimately rests on the
assumption that “all creditors have [had the] opportunity to discover
41 U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(1) (2012).
42 LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 12, at 143 (“Although [§ 9-203(b)(1)] does not
say who must give value, the assumption seems to be that it is the creditor.”).
43 In re Pan., N.Z., and Austl. Royal Mail Co. (1870) 5 Ch. App. 318 (holding that
where a company had charged its “undertaking, and all sums of money arising therefrom,” the word “undertaking” signified not merely the income from the business but
also present and future property of the company); ROBERT PENNINGTON, COMPANY
LAW 163 (2009) (“The floating charge enabled companies effectively to create a security over their business undertakings as a going concern . . . .”).
44 U.C.C. § 9-108 (2012).
45 See, e.g., Nat’l Ropes, Inc. v. Nat’l Diving Serv., Inc., 513 F.2d 53, 57 (5th Cir.
1975) (describing collateral in security agreement as “all property of the undersigned
of every name and nature whatsoever” not sufficient); ProGrowth Bank, Inc. v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., 2009 WL 2982939, *3 (D. Minn. Sept. 14, 2009) (“[U]se of such an
all-encompassing (or ‘supergeneric’) provision is not permitted to ‘describe’ the collateral when granting a security interest as it ‘does not reasonably identify the collateral.’ ” (citation omitted)).
46 See, e.g., Donald v. Madison Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 837, 840 (10th Cir. 1973)
(upholding a description that began “[a]ll items of personal property,” listed categories, and ended “[t]his is intended to cover everything owned by this business”);
Rosenberg v. Rudnick, 262 F. Supp. 635, 636 (D. Mass. 1967) (finding a valid grant of
security over inventory where the security agreement described the collateral as “all
the equipment, machinery, fixtures, inventory and accounts receivable of the debtor,
together with all additions thereto and all property now or hereafter substituted
therefor or otherwise acquired in the ordinary course of business”).
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the existence of the secured creditor.”47 In recognition of this dependence, both the English and American systems impose “perfection”
requirements designed to provide notice. Perfection requirements
include taking possession or control of collateral and public lien
registration.
The English and American registration systems differ in four relevant respects. First, American registrations are generally effective
when made, while English registrations relate back to charge creation.
Second, the English system is company-based, while the American system is name-based. Third, although both systems grant exceptions
from registration that result in secret liens, the exceptions are different. Lastly, the English system seeks to provide public notice, while
the American system seeks to provide notice only for the benefit of
prospective secured lenders.
1. Security Interest Priority Dates
In the United States, the approach taken by the Uniform Commercial Code is that the first creditor to file or perfect has priority
over creditors who file or perfect subsequently,48 regardless of when
the security agreements were made or the loan proceeds disbursed.
This has been referred to in the American literature as a “pure race”
approach, because “a filing secured creditor prevails even over those
unrecorded security interests of which he was aware.”49
The English rule is that competing company charges “rank in
order of their creation.”50 (That is also the basic rule for competing
real estate mortgages in the United States.)51 A charge is created
upon the execution of “a contract for valuable consideration to . . .
47 Harris & Mooney, supra note 13, at 2064 (‘[W]e see nothing unfair or untoward about permitting a secured creditor to go to the head of the line when earlier-intime creditors have not chosen to obtain security themselves and all creditors have an
opportunity to discover the existence of the secured creditor.”).
48 U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(1) (2012) (“Conflicting perfected security interests . . . rank
according to priority in time of filing or perfection. Priority dates from the earlier of
the time a filing covering the collateral is first made or the security interest . . . is first
perfected, if there is no period thereafter when there is neither filing nor
perfection.”).
49 Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 95 (1987).
50 Macmillan Inc. v. Bishopsgate Inv. Trust Place (No. 3), [1995] W.L.R. 978 (Ch.
D) at 1000. This rule was first articulated in Rice v. Rice, 2 Drew 73, 78 (1853) (“[A]s
between persons having only equitable interests, if their equities are in all other
respects equal, priority of time gives the better equity . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).
51 See LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 12, at 537 (noting that rule ranking mortgages in the order of grant “has a much wider effect, because the priority thus gained
is not so easily upset by the recording of one of the mortgages”).
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charge [an item of collateral, which] passes a beneficial interest by
way of property in that [collateral].”52 The order in which the competing creditors register their interests does not matter. However, the
Companies Act requires a charge created by a company to be perfected by registration within twenty-one days after the date of its creation.53 Failure to comply with this provision renders the charge void
against other creditors and against the liquidator or administrator of
the company.54
The deceptive nature of the English rule is well recognized. The
rule creates an “invisibility period” of up to twenty-one days:
The principal rule is that priority of competing charges is determined by the order of their creation. The combination of this and
the 21-day period allowed for registration has given rise to what has
been called the ‘21-day invisibility’ problem. A person who searches
the Companies Register, finds no record of an earlier charge and
takes and registers her own charge immediately, may nevertheless
be postponed to an earlier chargee who registers after the taking, or
even the registration, of the second charge but within the 21 days
allowed.55

The Law Commission has already recommended that priority be
determined solely by comparing dates of registration.56
52 Palmer v. Carey, [1926] A.C. 703 (HL) at 706–07 (appeal taken from Austl.).
53 The Act provides:
(1) The period allowed for registration of a charge created by a company
is—
(a) 21 days beginning with the day after the day on which the charge is
created, or
(b) if the charge is created outside the United Kingdom, 21 days beginning with the day after the day on which the instrument by which the
charge is created or evidenced (or a copy of it) could, in due course of
post (and if dispatched with due diligence) have been received in the
United Kingdom.
Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 870.
54 The Act provides:
(1) If a company creates a charge to which section 860 applies, the charge is
void (so far as any security on the company’s property or undertaking is
conferred by it) against—
(a) a liquidator of the company,
(b) an administrator of the company, and
(c) a creditor of the company,
Id. § 874.
55 LAW COMMISSION, supra note 19, ¶ 2.37
56 LAW COMMISSION, COMPANY SECURITY INTERESTS, LAW COMMISSION REPORT NO.
296 ¶ 11 (2005).
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2. Entity-based Versus Name-based Filing
The system for filing and searching is entity-based in England,
but name-based in the United States. That the English system is
entity-based means that a security interest registration is associated
with a particular company at the time it is made. That is, the secured
creditor selects the company against which to file or search by reference to the company records. The secured creditor can make the
match by name, company number, or other information in the company records,57 and the filing officer places the filing in the company
records. The secured creditor can err only by choosing the wrong
company.
In the American name-based system, the secured creditor must
file in the exact, correct name of the debtor. Because the filing
officer does not associate the security interest registration with the
company registration, the filing officer does not know whether the
security interest registration identifies an existing company. With difficulty, the filer can search the company records to discover the
debtor’s name, and computer search logic may or may not save filers
or searchers from minor errors in punctuation and abbreviation. But
the American system will not overcome the use of a trade name, or a
misspelling. As a result, as many as fifteen to seventeen percent of
registrations against corporate entities in the United States are
ineffective.58
In 2001, the Article 9 drafters laid the groundwork for a change
to entity-based filing, by changing the place for filing and searching to
the debtor’s incorporation state and requiring inclusion of the company number on each filing. Those changes made it possible for the
filing officers to associate filings with companies. But in the ensuing
nine years, only one or two commercially unimportant states actually
made the association.59 In 2010, the American Uniform Law Commis57 See Companies House, Form MG07, CHFP000, 05/10 Version 4.0, available at
http://www.companieshouse.gov.uk/forms/generalForms/MG07_particulars_for_
the_registration_of_a_charge_to_secure_a_series_of_debentures.pdf (last visited Jan.
16, 2013). Item 1 on that form makes submission of both the Company number and
the Company name mandatory. Id.
58 See generally Aneta Ferguson, The Trademark Filing Trap, 49 IDEA 197 (2009)
(finding empirically that 15% of secured creditors filed notice in the wrong filing
system and failed to file in the right system, making their security interests unenforceable against third parties); Rachelle Soderstrom, An Imperfect System of Perfection:
Fixing the Debtor Name Error Problem (unpublished paper 2010) (finding empirically that 17% of filings in the Vermont UCC filing system were ineffective).
59 For example, Maine combined UCC and incorporation records in a manner
that allows users to file against a corporation the user selects from among those regis-
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sion apparently abandoned this reform effort by dropping the
requirement that company numbers be included on filings,60 and
declaring the exact, correct name of an entity not necessarily to be the
name on the computerized records of the filing office.61 For the filing office to match filings to company records is no longer practical.
3. Secret Liens
Second, in both the English and American systems, some security
interests are effective without registration or any substitute method of
publicity. The effect is to validate secret liens, and deceive those who
deal with the debtor on the basis of the public record.
In the English system, all floating charges must be registered,62
but fixed charges must be registered only if they are of particular types
tered in the state. The system is at https://www10.informe.org/ucc/filing/begin.
shtml. Select “File a Financing Statement - Form UCC-1, then select “Standard UCC
Lien,” then select “Registered Organization,” then enter “Pickles” to see the names of
Maine corporations that contain “Pickles.”
60 See AMENDMENTS TO UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9, July 21, 2010, at
63–64 (specifying deletion of U.C.C. § 9-516(b)(5)(C)(iii) that had required, as a
condition of filing, “an organizational identification number for the debtor or indicate that the debtor has none”).
61 See id. at 49 (declaring in U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(1) that financing statement names
are “sufficient” only if the financing statements provide the names of debtors as indicated on the “public organic record[s] most recently filed”); id. at 14 (defining “public organic record” to mean “a record consisting of the record initially filed with or
issued by a State . . . to form or organize an organization” in U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(68)).
Most states charge a fee for a copy of the “public organic record” making the search
cumbersome.
62 Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 860(7)(g) (“This section applies to . . . (g) a
floating charge on the company’s property or undertaking . . . .”). An exception to
this rule arises under Regulation 4 of the Financial Collateral Arrangements (No. 2)
Regulations 2003 (SI 2003/3226), which implements Directive 2002/47/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of June 6, 2002 on financial collateral
arrangements, as amended, into English law. The regulation exempts floating
charges involving a “security financial collateral arrangement” (as defined in SI 2003/
3226, Regulation 3) from the registration requirements of the Companies Act. However, the only English case to interpret this exception found that to constitute a
“security financial collateral arrangement” control by the chargee was required. See,
Gray & Ors v G-T-P Group Ltd Re F2G Realisations Limited (in Liquidation) [2010]
EWHC 1772 (Ch). According to SI 2003/3226, Regulation 3, for a floating charge to
constitute a “security financial collateral arrangement” the floating charge must be
“registered or otherwise designated so as to be in the possession or under the control
of the collateral-taker.” This has been interpreted by at least one English commentator as meaning that the “definition of ‘security financial collateral arrangement’ and
of ‘security interest’ in the Regulations means that they do not apply to floating
charges before the charge has crystallised and some control over the collateral has
passed to the charge holder.” G MCCORMACK, REGISTRATION OF COMPANY CHARGES
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listed in the Companies Act.63 The list does not, for example, include
charges on insurance policies64 and on shares.65 The shortcomings
caused the Law Commission to conclude:
[B]ecause the list of registrable charges is incomplete (in part
because the list has been little changed since its introduction over a
century ago), and because the priority aspect has developed only as
an indirect effect of attempts to secure compliance, the current
scheme does not seem to fulfil either its ‘public notice’ function or
its ‘priority’ function efficiently.66

The American system has the same shortcoming with respect to
security interests in insurance policies or shares.67 In addition, the
American system authorizes secret liens in bank accounts, investment
(3d ed. 2009). We agree with the view expressed by Professor McCormack. Given the
limited applicability of this exception (particularly given that it only applies to crystallized floating charges, which arguably are not floating charges at all), this Article
treats all floating charges as needing to be registered.
63 The Act provides:
(1) A company that creates a charge to which this section applies must
deliver the prescribed particulars of the charge, together with the instrument (if any) by which the charge is created or evidenced, to the registrar
for registration before the end of the period allowed for registration. . . .
(7) This section applies to the following charges—
(a) a charge on land or any interest in land . . . ,
(b) a charge created or evidenced by an instrument which, if executed
by an individual, would require registration as a bill of sale,
(c) a charge for the purposes of securing any issue of debentures,
(d) a charge on uncalled share capital of the company,
(e) a charge on calls made but not paid,
(f) a charge on book debts of the company,
(g) a floating charge on the company’s property or undertaking,
(h) a charge on a ship or aircraft, or any share in a ship,
(i) a charge on goodwill or on any intellectual property.
Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 860.
64 See Paul & Frank Ltd. v. Discount Bank (Overseas) Ltd., [1967] Ch. 348 (holding that a fixed charge over an insurance policy did not require registration and was
valid against the liquidator of the company); LOUISE GULLIFER & JENNIFER PAYNE, CORPORATE FINANCE LAW 267 (2011).
65 See Arthur D Little Ltd. (In administration) v. Ableco Finance LLC, [2003] Ch.
217 (holding that a charge on shares was a fixed charge not requiring registration);
EILIS FERRAN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE LAW 399 (2008).
66 LAW COMMISSION, supra note 19, ¶ 3.10.
67 See U.C.C. § 9-109(d)(8) (2012) (excluding security interests in insurance
from Uniform Commercial Code coverage); id. § 9-310(b)(5), (6), (8) (excusing filing to perfect a security interest in securities).
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property, and some other kinds of collateral.68 The American system
does so by requiring that the secured creditor take “control” over the
collateral, but defining control in a manner that taking it is unlikely to
alert third parties to the existence of the security interest.
The American requirement for perfecting a security interest in a
bank account is illustrative. No public filing is required.69 The
secured creditor can perfect by taking control.70 The secured creditor
takes control by entering into an agreement with the debtor and the
bank, in which the bank agrees to “comply with instructions
originated by the secured party directing disposition of the funds in
the deposit account without further consent by the debtor.”71 The
secured creditor has control “even if the debtor retains the right to
direct the disposition of funds from the deposit account.”72 Thus, the
debtor can continue to use the secured-creditor-controlled account in
the exact same manner as if it were unencumbered. The bank “is not
required to confirm the existence of the [potential control] agreement to another person unless requested to do so by its customer.”73
The result is a lien that is invisible to the public, including all but the
most diligent who deal with the debtor. Similar potential for secret
liens exists with respect to “control” of securities and commodity
accounts.74
68 See, e.g., Lipson, supra note 17, at 421 (“[R]ecent revisions to Article 9 of the
UCC . . . tolerate secret liens that may arise on such increasingly important assets such
as data, intellectual property, bank accounts, and securities.”).
69 U.C.C. § 9-310(b) (2012) (“The filing of a financing statement is not necessary
to perfect a security interest . . . (8) in deposit accounts . . . .”); id. § 9-309(1) (“The
following security interests are perfected when they attach: (1) a purchase-money
security interest in consumer goods . . . .”).
70 Id. § 9-314(a) (“A security interest in . . . deposit accounts . . . may be perfected
by control of the collateral under Section . . . 9-104 . . . .”).
71 Id. § 9-104(a)(2).
72 Id. § 9-104(b).
73 Id. § 9-342.
74 Id. § 9-310(b)(8) (“The filing of a financing statement is not necessary to perfect a security interest . . . (8) in . . . investment property . . . which is perfected by
control under section 9-314.”). Section 9-314(c) states that “[a] security interest in
investment property is perfected by control under Section 9-106.” Id. § 9-314(c). Section 9-106 provides that a “person has control of a certificated security, uncertificated
security, or security entitlement as provided in Section 8-106.” Id. § 9-106. Section 8106(f) provides:
A purchaser who has satisfied the requirements of subsection (c) or (d) has
control, even if the registered owner in the case of subsection (c) or the
entitlement holder in the case of subsection (d) retains the right to make
substitutions for the uncertificated security or security entitlement, to originate instructions or entitlement orders to the issuer or securities intermedi-
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English law does not permit secret charges in bank accounts.75
Ordinarily, a charge against a bank account would be a floating
charge.76 As was discussed above, with one minor exception floating
charges must be registered.77
English and American law differ with respect to the sale of
accounts receivable. American law regards such sales as the
equivalent of security interests and requires registration.78 English law
does not require registration of a sale of accounts:
In the case of a factoring agreement, the purchase rights of the factor, which are not charges, do not require registration. Consequently, there is no means in the nature of public notice by which a
competing factor or secured creditor can discover the existence of a
previous sale of the book debts.79

4. Public Notice Versus Prospective-Lender Notice
The English registration system makes information about registrations more widely available than does the American system. The
English broadly conceive the system’s purposes to include the provision of information to the public,80 credit rating agencies, insolvency
administrators, and creditors who no longer have leverage over their
debtor because they have already committed their funds:
Commentators now recognise that registration fulfills several
purposes:
ary, or otherwise to deal with the uncertificated security or security
entitlement.
Id. § 8-106.
75 A fixed charge could be taken over an account that is segregated and blocked,
that is, where control over the account rests with the creditor. Such fixed charges are,
however, difficult to administer, and, as a consequence, are used in limited contexts.
76 See infra Part II.B.
77 Companies Act, 2006, c.46, § 860(7)(g) (requiring registration of “a floating
charge on the company’s property or undertaking”). See supra note 62.
78 U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(35) (2012) (“ ‘Security interest’ includes any interest of . . . a
buyer of accounts . . . .”); id. § 9-109(a)(3) (“[T]his article applies to . . . a sale of
accounts . . . . .”); id § 9-310(a) (“[A] financing statement must be filed to perfect all
security interests . . . .”).
79 Michael Bridge, England and Wales, in CROSS-BORDER SECURITY OVER RECEIVABLES 147, 166 (Harry C. Sigman & Eva-Maria Kieninger eds., 2009).
80 LAW COMMISSION, supra note 19, ¶ 3.9 (“[R]egistration was originally introduced to provide information to the public about whether a company had charged its
assets, in order to prevent it giving an impression of ‘false wealth’ by appearing to own
assets that in fact were charged in favour of others.”). But see id. ¶ 4.73 (“We provisionally propose that there should not be a general requirement to provide further
information or a copy of the security agreement to a member of the public upon
request, but we would welcome consultees’ views.”).
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(1) it provides information on the state of the encumbrances on a
company’s property to those who may be interested (for example,
creditors and those considering or advising on dealing with the
company, including credit reference agencies, financial analysts and
potential investors);
(2) it assists companies in enabling them to give some form of
assurance to potential lenders that their property is unencumbered;
(3) it provides a degree of protection to a chargee, in relation to
the validity and priority of its registered charge; and
(4) it assists receivers and liquidators in deciding whether or not to
acknowledge the validity of a mortgage or charge.81

The English system also provides relatively generous access to the
terms of the security agreement. Each company is required to keep
“available for inspection a copy of every instrument creating a charge
requiring registration”82 and “a register of charges . . . , [into which
the company is required to enter] (a) all charges specifically affecting
property of the company, and (b) all floating charges on the whole or
part of the company’s property or undertaking,”83 which “in each case
[shall] give a short description of the property charged, the amount
of the charge and, except in the cases of securities to bearer, the
names of the persons entitled to it.”84 The documents and the register are required to be open to the inspection of any creditor or member of the company without payment of a fee.85 Any person can
inspect the documents and the company’s register of charges (but not
copies of the instruments) on payment of a nominal fee.86
By contrast, the American system operates on the principle that
existing liens are the business of no one but the debtor, and those to
whom the debtor wishes to disclose them:
Because creditors of and prospective purchasers from a debtor may
have legitimate needs for more detailed information, it is necessary
to provide a procedure under which the secured party will be
required to provide information. On the other hand, the secured
party should not be under a duty to disclose any details of the
debtor’s financial affairs to any casual inquirer or competitor who
may inquire. For this reason, this section gives the right to request
information to the debtor only. The debtor may submit a request in
connection with negotiations with subsequent creditors and purchasers, as well as for the purpose of determining the status of its
81 Id. ¶ 2.21 (footnote omitted).
82 Companies Act, 2006, § 875(1).
83 Id. § 876(1).
84 Id. § 876(2).
85 Id. § 877(4).
86 Id.
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credit relationship or demonstrating which of its assets are free of a
security interest.87

Despite the acknowledgement that creditors and prospective purchasers from the debtor may need additional information from the
secured creditor, Article 9 gives only the debtor a legal right to obtain
it. “Section 9-210 provides a statutory procedure under which the
secured party, at the debtor’s request, may be required to make disclosure. However, in many cases, information may be forthcoming without the need to resort to the formalities of that section.”88 The
information obtainable through U.C.C. § 9-210 does not include a
copy of the security agreement. In most cases, however, the debtor
will have a copy. No provision of Article 9 requires that either the
debtor or the secured party furnish a copy of the security agreement
to anyone.
The difference between the English and American systems in
access to information is most visible in the example of an unsecured
creditor who is considering whether to take legal action against its
debtor. In the English system, this creditor would have the right to
review copies of every instrument creating a charge against the company. In the American system, this creditor would have the right to
only the names of persons who might have security interests and general categories of property those interests might encumber.89
C. Enforcement
If an American debtor defaults on its obligations under the security agreement, the secured creditor has by law the right to repossess
tangible personal property collateral by self-help if it can do so without breach of the peace.90 An English debtor has the same right only
if the security agreement so provides, but security agreements almost
invariably so provide.91 Neither system permits self-help with respect
87 U.C.C. § 9-210 cmt. 3.
88 Id. § 9-502 cmt. 2.
89 Typically, an American “notice filing” will include only the name and address
of the debtor, the name and address of the creditor, and an indication of the collateral. See id. § 9-521(a) (official form for notice filing).
90 See id. § 9-609(a) (“After default, a secured party . . . may take possession of
the collateral . . . .”); id. § 9-609(b) (“A secured party may proceed . . . without judicial
process, if it proceeds without breach of the peace.”).
91 See GOODE, supra note 34, at 680 (“The right to take possession . . . invariably
is[ ] expressly reserved in the security instrument, and is . . . equally available, whether
the creditor is the holder of a legal mortgage, an equitable mortgage or a charge. . . .
If the security comprises goods which can be seized without entry on to the premises
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to real estate.92 In both systems the secured creditor can sell the collateral under its own power of sale93 or through a court-supervised
sale,94 and apply the proceeds of sale to payment of the secured obligation.95 In both, the debtor has the right to “redeem” the collateral
of the debtor, the creditor may use self-help, taking the goods without an order of the
court . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
92 For the United States, see Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments,
90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 453, 480 (Ct. App. 2009) (“The statutes . . . reflect a policy, with deep
roots in English law, barring the use of forceful self-help to enforce a right to possession of real property and requiring instead the use of judicial process to gain possession.” (quoting Glass v. Najafi, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 606, 608 (2000)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). For England, see GOODE, supra note 34, at 680–81 (“[W]here the
asset given as security is land, the creditor will . . . appoint a receiver to take possession
for him or apply for a possession order so as to avoid the possibility of a breach of the
peace, as well as liability to prosecution if he were to make a violent entry . . . . [A]
court order is necessary to enforce a right to possession of land under a mortgage
securing a regulated agreement within the Consumer Credit Act 1974 . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
93 For England, see Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20, § 101, which
provides:
(1) A mortgagee, where the mortgage is made by deed, shall, by virtue of
this Act, have the following powers, to the like extent as if they had been in
terms conferred by the mortgage deed . . . :
(i) A power, when the mortgage money has become due, to sell . . . the
mortgaged property, or any part thereof, either subject to prior charges or
not . . . .
94 For the United States, see U.C.C. § 9-601(a) (“A secured party [ ]may reduce a
claim to judgment, foreclose, or otherwise enforce the claim [or] security interest . . .
by any available judicial procedure . . . .”). For England, see Law of Property Act,
1925, § 91 (“(2) . . . . [T]he court, on the request of the mortgagee . . . may direct a
sale of the mortgaged property . . . (6) . . . ‘mortgaged property’ includes the . . .
interest which a mortgagee would have had power to convey if the statutory power of
sale were applicable.”). See also id. § 205(1)(xvi) (“ ‘Mortgage’ includes any charge . . .
on any property for securing money or money’s worth . . . .”).
95 For the United States, see U.C.C. § 9-610(a) (stating that after default a
secured party may sell or otherwise dispose of any or all of the collateral); id. § 9615(a) (“A secured party shall apply . . . the cash proceeds of disposition under Section 9-610 in the following order to [expenses of sale and] the satisfaction of obligations secured by the security interest . . . under which the disposition is made . . . .”).
For England, see Law of Property Act, 1925, §105 (“The money . . . received by the
mortgagee, arising from the sale, after discharge of prior incumbrances to which the
sale is not made subject, if any . . . shall be . . . applied by him, first, in payment of all
costs . . . and expenses properly incurred by him as incident to the sale . . . and
secondly, in discharge of the mortgage money, interest, and costs . . . due under the
mortgage; and the residue . . . shall be paid to the person entitled to the mortgaged
property . . . .”). See also id. § 205(1)(xvi) (“ ‘Mortgage’ includes any charge . . . on any
property for securing money or money’s worth . . . .”).
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after default by paying the full amount due under the contract prior
to sale of the collateral.96
In summary, the English and American systems are highly similar
with respect to attachment and enforcement of security interests.
Both function poorly with regard to perfection, although they do so in
different ways.
II. THE FIXED CHARGE-FLOATING CHARGE DISTINCTION
The distinction between fixed and floating charges is important
because floating charges are subject to the English Carve-out, while
fixed charges are not. The distinction has been difficult to make
because no statute defines “floating charge”97 and the process of
defining it by case law has proceeded slowly. As Professor Goode put
it in an article advocating abolition of the floating charge:
Corporate floating charges have now been with us for some 135
years—plenty of time, one might think, for the courts to have
worked out in detail their nature and priority. . . . It is astonishing
that after all this time we still extol the virtues of a security device
which continues to generate controversy and differences of opinion
among the judiciary as to its essential nature.98

The slow process of case-based definition began in 1903. In In re
Yorkshire Woolcombers Ass’n Ltd.,99 Lord Justice Romer set forth the fol96 E.g., U.C.C. § 9-623(a) (“A debtor . . . may redeem collateral.”); id. § 9-623(b)
(“To redeem collateral, a person shall tender . . . fulfillment of all obligations secured
by the collateral . . . .”); id. § 9-623(c) (“A redemption may occur at any time before a
secured party . . . has disposed of collateral or entered into a contract for its disposition . . . .”). On the English side, Ferran states:
Any provision in the terms of a mortgage which purports to remove the
mortgagor’s right to redeem, or which would indirectly tend to have the
effect of making the mortgage irredeemable, is regarded in equity as a ‘clog’
or ‘fetter’ on the equity of redemption and, as such, it is void. The principle
that clogs on the equity of redemption are void applies to all types of mortgages and also to charges, including floating charges.
FERRAN, supra note 65, at 365–66 (footnotes omitted).
97 Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 251 (purporting to define a floating charge as “a
charge which, as created, was a floating charge”); id. §§ 40(1), 176A(9). That is not a
definition of floating charge, but merely a statement that crystallizations will be
ignored for most purposes in insolvency cases. See Smith (Adm’r of Cosslett (Contractors) Ltd.) v. Bridgend Cnty. Borough Council, [2002] 1 A.C. 336 (HL) at 357 (Lord
Scott of Foscote L.J.) (“[T]here has never been any statutory definition of ‘floating
charge.’ The definitions are all judicial ones and, in most cases, expressed in order to
distinguish floating charges from fixed charges.”).
98 Roy Goode, The Case for Abolition of the Floating Charge, in COMPANY CHARGES:
SPECTRUM AND BEYOND, supra note 15, at 21.
99 [1903] 2 Ch. 284; aff’d sub nom. Illingworth v. Houldsworth, [1904] A.C. 355.
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lowing three-part test for the existence of a floating charge. A charge
is floating:
(1.) [I]f it is a charge on a class of assets of a company present and
future;
(2.) [I]f that class is one which, in the ordinary course of the business of the company, would be changing from time to time; and
(3.) [I]f you find that by the charge it is contemplated that, until
some future step is taken by or on behalf of those interested in the
charge, the company may carry on its business in the ordinary way
as far as concerns the particular class of assets [subject to the
charge].100

The first criterion makes clear that a floating charge can extend
to assets the debtor does not yet own, or that do not yet even exist.
The second indicates that a floating charge is typically taken over
“revolving assets”101 such as inventory or accounts receivable. The
third is interpreted to mean that the floating charge debtor remains
“free to manage and deal with” the collateral in the ordinary course of
business until some future event occurs which terminates that right.102
Lord Justice Romer acknowledged that he was not giving a precise definition of the floating charge.
I certainly do not intend to attempt to give an exact definition of
the term “floating charge,” nor am I prepared to say that there will
not be a floating charge within the meaning of the [Companies] Act
[1900], which does not contain all the three characteristics that I
am about to mention, but I certainly think that if a charge has the
three characteristics that I am about to mention it is a floating
charge.103

As he predicted, later cases chipped away at the relevance of the
first two criteria.104
The essence of the distinction remained unclear for the next onehundred years. In 2001, through Lord Millett, the Privy Council in
100 In re Yorkshire Woolcombers Ass’n. Ltd., [1903] 2 Ch. at 295.
101 GOODE, supra note 34, at 724. (“The concept underlying a floating charge is
therefore one of a class of revolving assets . . . .”).
102 Id.
103 In re Yorkshire Woolcombers, [1903] 2 Ch. at 295.
104 See, e.g., In re Croftbell Ltd., [1990] BCLC 844 (holding that a charge on subsidiary shares was floating despite the absence of regular turnover); In re ASRS Establishment Ltd., [2000] 2 BCLC 631 (holding that a charge over an escrow account was
floating despite the account not being subject to fluctuation); Smith v. Bridgend
Cnty. Borough Council, [2002] 1 A.C. 336 at 357 (holding that a charge on heavy
duty coal-washing plants was floating despite the absence of turnover in the
collateral).
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Agnew v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue105 held that “the first two [criteria] are typical of a floating charge but they are not distinctive of it,
since they are not necessarily inconsistent with a fixed charge.”106
Lord Millett went on to say that Lord Justice Romer’s third criterion
“is the hallmark of a floating charge and serves to distinguish it from a
fixed charge.”107 This reduction of Lord Justice Romer’s criteria from
three to one was corroborated in 2005 by Lord Scott. In In re Spectrum
Plus Ltd., Lord Scott stated that “if a security has Romer LJ’s third
characteristic . . . it qualifies as a floating charge, and cannot be a
fixed charge, whatever may be its other characteristics.”108 In other
words, Lord Justice Romer’s third criterion for characterizing a
charge as floating—lack of secured creditor control over the collateral—is both necessary and sufficient; while Lord Justice Romer’s first
and second criteria are merely indicative.
A. Control as the Distinction
Although his comment was not ultimately as influential as Lord
Justice Romer’s, Lord Justice Williams also weighed in on the distinguishing factor in Yorkshire Woolcombers. He said:
[W]hat you do require to make a [fixed charge] is that the security
whenever it has once come into existence, and been identified or
appropriated as a security, shall never thereafter at the will of the
[chargor] cease to be a security. If at the will of the [chargor] he
can dispose of it and prevent its being any longer a security,
although something else may be substituted more or less for it, that
is not a ‘[fixed] security.’109

In Agnew, Lord Millett quoted Lord Justice Williams’s comment
as part of his rationale for declaring that the first two of Lord Justice
Romer’s three criteria were not necessary components of a floating
charge.110 In so doing, he stated that “[s]ince the existence of a fixed
charge would make it impossible for the company to carry on business
in the ordinary way without the consent of the charge holder, it follows that its ability to do so without such consent is inconsistent with

105 [2001] 2 A.C. 710.
106 Id. ¶ 13.(Lord Millett L.J.).
107 Id.
108 In re Spectrum Plus Ltd., [2005] 2 A.C. 680, ¶ 107, (Lord Scott L.J.).
109 In re Yorkshire Woolcombers Ass’n Ltd., [1903] 2 Ch. 284 at 294.
110 Agnew v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue, [2001] 2 A.C. 710 at 719–20.
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the fixed nature of the charge.”111 This viewpoint was clarified and
expanded upon by the House of Lords112 in the Spectrum case:
T]he essential characteristic of a floating charge, the characteristic
that distinguishes it from a fixed charge, is that the asset subject to
the charge is not finally appropriated as a security for the payment
of the debt until the occurrence of some future event. In the
meantime the chargor is left free to use the charged asset and to
remove it from the security. .113

After Spectrum, Professor Goode states that:
The acid test for distinguishing between a fixed and a floating
charge is not whether the assets comprising the security are fixed or
circulating but whether the creditor has or has not taken sufficient
steps to exclude the debtor’s right to continue to manage the assets
and dispose of them in the ordinary course of business free from
the charge.114

In essence, the debtor has “control” if the debtor can dispose of
the collateral free of the charge. The disposition intended is in the
English ordinary course of business, not the American ordinary
course of business.115
B. Collateral’s Nature as the Distinction
Agnew and Spectrum held the existence of creditor control to be
legally determinative of whether a charge is fixed or floating. But it is
the collateral’s nature that is actually determinative.
In theory a floating charge “is not confined to circulating assets
but can be made to cover any description of property”116 and “a fixed
charge may be taken over revolving assets.”117 But, as we previously
noted, secured creditors gain greater advantage from fixed charges
than from floating charges, principally because floating charges are
111 Id. ¶ 13. (Lord Millett L.J.).
112 On October 1, 2009, The Supreme Court replaced the Appellate Committee of
the House of Lords as the highest court in the United Kingdom.
113 In re Spectrum, [2005] 2 A.C. 680, ¶ 111 (Lord Scott).
114 GOODE, supra note 34, at 726. See also FERRAN, supra note 65, at 378 (“The
essence of the floating charge . . . is that the assets that are the subject-matter of the
security remain under the management and control of the [debtor].”).
115 The distinction between the English ordinary course and the American ordinary course is discussed infra notes 158–161 and accompanying text.
116 GOODE, supra note 34, at 726.
117 Id. See In re Spectrum, [2005] 2 A.C. 680, ¶ 80 (“There is no doubt that . . . it is
in law possible for a company to create a security consisting of a fixed charge over all
its present and future book debts.”). “Revolving assets” is synonymous in meaning to
“circulating assets.”
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subject to the English Carve-out. “Hence, in England banking lawyers
have had a powerful incentive to develop new types of security which
will be classifiable as ‘fixed’ from the outset.”118 Secured lenders also
have sufficient leverage in their dealings with borrowers to frame their
charges against revolving assets as fixed.119
In doing so, however, secured creditors encounter a practical difficulty. To make their charges fixed, they must actually control their
borrowers’ disposition of the revolving assets. Such control does not
merely impede the borrowers’ businesses,120 it is expensive for
secured creditors to exercise.
In Spectrum, Lord Walker gave this succinct description of the
operation of a typical business: “Trading stock is sold and becomes
represented by book debts; these are collected and paid into the bank;
the trader’s overdraft facility enables it to draw cheques in favour of its
suppliers to pay for new stock; and so the trading cycle continues.”121
Translated from the English to American, Lord Walker is pointing out
that businesses sell their inventory on credit. Their customers’ obligations to pay are accounts receivable. The businesses collect the
accounts receivable and deposit the proceeds to their accounts at
their secured creditor banks. The businesses then write checks on the
bank accounts to purchase new inventory to replace what was sold.
The “overdraft facility” to which Lord Walker refers is the business’
loan account with the bank, which is often combined with the bank
account (a debt owing from the bank to the business) in a single,
negative balance. These assets, inventory, accounts, and bank deposits are the typical revolving assets of a business. The remaining assets
of a typical business, real estate, equipment, and intangibles such as
intellectual property and licenses are “fixed” assets.
Under Spectrum, a charge against accounts receivable can be a
fixed charge only if “the assets can be released from the charge only
118 George L. Gretton, Reception Without Integration? Floating Charges and Mixed Systems, 78 TUL. L. REV. 307, 315 (2003).
119 See In re Spectrum, [2005] 2 A.C. 680, ¶ 101 (Lord Scott LJ) (“[T]he lenders are
usually in the stronger bargaining position and able to stipulate the terms to be
included in the debenture which will constitute their security. So it is not in the least
surprising to find attempts by lenders to obtain fixed charges as security rather than
floating charges . . . .”).
120 In re Woodroffes (Musical Instruments) Ltd., [1986] Ch. 366 at 377–78 (“The
thinking behind the creation of [floating] charges has always been a recognition that
a fixed charge on the whole undertaking and assets of the company would paralyse it
and prevent it from carrying on its business . . . .” (citing In re Florence Land and
Public Works Co., Ex parte Moor [1878-79] 10 Ch. D. 530, at 541 (Sir George Jessel
M.R.))).
121 In re Spectrum, [2005] 2 A.C. 680, ¶ 139.
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with the active concurrence of the chargee.”122 Lord Walker gave this
illustration of what arrangement might suffice:
[I]f the terms of the debenture were such as to require the trader to
pay all its collected debts into the bank and to prohibit the trader
from drawing on the account (so that the account is blocked), a
charge on debts, described as a fixed or specific charge, would
indeed take effect as such . . . . In those circumstances the chargee
would be in control, prior to crystallisation, and the trader would be
unable to trade in the ordinary way without the chargee’s positive
concurrence. In Agnew’s case . . . Lord Millett pointed out that it
was not enough to provide in the debenture for an account to be
blocked, if it was not in fact operated as a blocked account.123

What that illustration required of the bank was its “positive concurrence” in each disbursement of funds from the blocked account.
The credit agreement in Spectrum provided for the bank’s positive
concurrence in decisions dealing with the accounts while they
remained outstanding,124 but not in withdrawing funds from the bank
account. The provision at issue was as follows:
With reference to the book debts and other debts hereby specifically charged [Spectrum] shall pay into [Spectrum’s] account with
the bank all moneys which it may receive in respect of such debts
and shall not without the prior consent in writing of the bank sell
factor discount or otherwise charge or assign the same in favour of
any other person or purport to do so and [Spectrum] shall if called
upon to do so by the bank from time to time execute legal assignments of such book debts and other debts to the bank.125

Thus, the Bank had an agreement entitling it to whatever control
it chose to take—what we refer to in this Article as “potential control”—but it hadn’t actually taken that control. The insufficiency of
potential control to create a fixed charge suggests that, for the English
banks to succeed in their quest for fixed charges over the revolving
assets, the banks will have to insist on approving each disbursement
from the bank account. Neither we nor the English commentators
can imagine bankers seeking to understand and meaningfully approve
122 Id. ¶ 138 (Lord Walker L.J.).
123 Id. ¶ 140 (citations omitted).
124 Addressing the credit agreement provisions regarding the accounts, Lord
Hope stated “[t]here is no doubt that their effect was to prevent the company from
entering into transactions with any third party in relation to the book debts prior to
their collection. The uncollected book debts were to be held exclusively for the benefit of the bank.” Id. ¶ 55.
125 Id. ¶ 81 (Lord Scott L.J.) (quoting the provision).
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each disbursement from their debtors’ bank accounts.126 We can
imagine them setting up a system in which software evaluates each
disbursement by some lax standard and claiming that the system
meets the Spectrum test.
Such purported control seems unlikely to prove sufficient, however, because its obvious intent would be to defeat the policy favoring
preferential creditors. As Lord Walker stated in Spectrum, “there is a
public interest which overrides unrestrained freedom of contract. . . .
On the fixed/floating issue, it is ensuring that preferential creditors
obtain the measure of protection which Parliament intended them to
have.”127
Thus, we agree with the English commentators that the banks’
quest for fixed charges over revolving assets has almost certainly come
to an end128:
It is true that the banks still hanker after the ability to take a priority-preserving fixed charge over receivables by stipulating for control over accounts as dictated by Spectrum, but in practice this will
not happen, as few companies will be willing to subject themselves
to a regime requiring them to open a blocked account and obtain
approval for every withdrawal from their account. For most practical purposes the fixed charge over book debts is dead.129

The de facto dominance of the collateral’s nature test over the
control test is explained legally by way of a presumption. As Goode
126 One states:
[I]t would . . . be necessary that the consent to the transfer to the current
account was, for every transfer, an independent act of will by the chargee, so
that the chargee was not under any obligation to permit transfers. There
are . . . practical problems with this. First, it is expensive and time-consuming for the chargee and secondly it has the effect that the chargor cannot be
assured of having cash available to meet the expenses it incurs in the ordinary course of business.
GULLIFER & PAYNE, supra note 64, at 253–54 (footnotes omitted).
127 In re Spectrum, [2005] 2 A.C. 680, ¶ 141 (Lord Walker L.J.). The preferential
creditors are employees and funds for the payment of employees, including pension
and health benefit funds. The policy appears to be that employees should be paid
before floating charge holders. Rationales probably include (1) that employees frequently lack the ability to compete with floating charge holders in contracting and (2)
the government might otherwise have to reimburse the employees through welfare
payments.
128 E.g. Michael Bridge, England and Wales in CROSS-BORDER SECURITY OVER
TANGIBLES 125, 130 (Harry C. Sigman & Eva-Maria Kieninger eds., 2007) (“In recent
times, the controls required for a fixed charge have been reemphasized, so that in
practical terms it is impossible to take a fixed charge over a debtor’s circulating capital.” (footnotes omitted)).
129 Goode, supra note 98, at 22.
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put it, “[a] charge over circulating assets is [ ]thus presumptively
intended as a floating charge, so that restrictions on the debtor[‘s] . . .
ordinary dealing powers need to be specifically agreed, whereas a
charge over fixed assets is assumed to be intended as a fixed
charge.”130 Case law corroborates that view:
[If] the charged property is stock, or book debts—i.e. where the
assets are naturally fluctuating—the court will readily conclude that
a liberty for the [debtor] to deal with the charged assets is inconsistent with a fixed charge; where . . . the assets are specific and do not
necessarily fluctuate, some liberty to release the charged assets may
not be inconsistent with a fixed charge.131

The effect is to bring the analysis of Yorkshire Woolcombers full circle. Although the third part of Lord Justice Romer’s test—secured
creditor control—has prevailed legally, the practical effect is much
the same as if the second part—the revolving nature of the collateral—had. In the remainder of our analysis, we will assume that
secured creditors typically “take a fixed charge over fixed assets and a
floating charge merely over circulating assets.”132
C. Crystallization
Crystallization is an event by which a floating charge becomes a
fixed charge.133 Once crystallized, the charge will have priority as a
fixed charge against later competitors for the collateral. The effect is
not, however, retroactive:
A crystallized floating charge ranks as a fixed charge for the purposes of determining its priority against other interests in the company’s property which are created or acquired after crystallization.
Although there is one case that suggests otherwise, the better view is
that crystallization does not affect the priority of a floating charge
against other interests in the same property which pre[-]date
crystallization.134
130 GOODE, supra note 34, at 726. “Fixed assets” are assets like equipment or land,
which a debtor expects to hold on a long-term basis. “Circulating assets” are assets
such as inventory/stock-in-trade, accounts/receivables, and crops. The debtor is constantly acquiring and disposing of these short-term assets. They represent the asset
side of the debtor’s working capital.
131 In re Cimex Tissues, Ltd., [1994] BCLC 626 at 635.
132 GOODE, supra note 34, at 726.
133 See In re Spectrum Plus Ltd., [2005] 2 A.C. 680, ¶ 108 (Lord Scott L.J.) (“[O]n
the occurrence of a crystallization event, [e.g.,] liquidation, the [collateral] at that
time would be subject to the fixed charge . . . .”).
134 FERRAN, supra note 65, at 388 (footnotes omitted).
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Although crystallization and default are independent concepts,
crystallization often occurs at the time of default and many of the
issues that arise, and the contract provisions addressing those issues,
are similar.135 Both crystallization and default are events that mark
the beginning of the floating charge holder’s right to enforce the
charge against specific collateral. Crystallization implies a revocation
of the debtor’s right to deal freely with the collateral, but the revocation may not affect the rights of third parties until they learn of it.136
Crystallization can occur by operation of law, automatically in
accord with a provision of the security agreement, or pursuant to contractual notice from the secured creditor to the debtor. Crystallization occurs by operation of law upon the occurrence of any of four
events137: (1) cessation of the debtor company’s business;138 (2) the
commencement of liquidation/winding-up;139 (3) the creditor lawfully taking possession of the charged assets;140 or (4) the appointment of a receiver141 or of an administrator by a qualifying charge
holder.142 The commencement of administration proceedings does
not, in and of itself, result in crystallization.143
The debtor and the secured creditor can also, by agreement
between them, provide “that any specified event” will cause the charge
135 “Default” is not defined in the U.C.C. Professors LoPucki and Warren define
“default” as “the debtor’s failure to pay the debt when due or otherwise perform the
agreement between the debtor and creditor.” LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 12, at
217. Early English cases used the term “default” to refer to what is now known as a
“crystallization event.” See, e.g., Evans v. Rival Granite, [1910] 2 K.B. 979, at 990 (Lord
Williams L.J.) (“[The floating charge holder] may exercise his right[s] [over the collateral] whenever he pleases after default.” (quoting The Governments Stock and
Other Securities Investment Co. v. Manila Ry. Co., [1897] A.C. 81, at 86) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
136 See infra Part IV (discussing the effect of crystallization on third parties).
137 See Edward Nelson & Co. v. Faber & Co, [1903] 2 KB 367, at 376.
138 See. In re Woodroffes (Musical Instruments) Ltd., [1986] Ch. 366, at 377–78.
139 See In re Panama New Zealand and Australian Royal Mail Co., [1869-70] 5 Ch.
App. 318, at 322–23.
140 See Mercantile Bank of India Ltd. v. Chartered Bank of India, Australia &
China, [1937] 1 All E.R. 231, at 240–41.
141 See Evans v. Rival Granite, [1910] 2 K.B. 979, at 986–88, 1000.
142 Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, sch. B1 ¶ 14.
143 FERRAN, supra note 65, at 390 (“The commencement of administration proceedings in respect of a company in accordance with the Insolvency Act 1986 does not
constitute an implied crystallizing event.”); GULLIFER & PAYNE, supra note 64, at 244 &
n.204 (stating that the appointment of an administrator “by the directors or by the
court” does not result in crystallization because this does not constitute an “intervention by the chargee”).
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to crystallize.144 The agreement can provide that crystallization occurs
automatically or upon notice from the secured creditor to the debtor.
The purpose of an automatic crystallization provision is usually to crystallize the charge before a lien creditor establishes rights in the collateral or the debtor grants a fixed charge to a competing creditor.145
If so provided in the security agreement, automatic crystallization
can be reversed, a process referred to as de-crystallization.146 De-crystallization would allow the debtor to continue to deal freely with the
collateral despite the covenant breach.147
Automatic crystallization can occur in situations where the creditor does not desire it.148 Professor Ferran notes that if “the crystallization clause is so widely drafted that the [creditor] has frequently to
agree to de-crystallization, this pattern of events may lead a court to
conclude that the original agreement was later varied by the parties so
as to exclude the automatic crystallization provision.”149 De-crystallization may also force consideration of whether the “re-floated” charge
constitutes the same floating charge as before or a new floating
charge,150 which would trigger a fresh registration requirement, establish a new and later priority date, and restart the statutory period for
the avoidance of floating charges in insolvency proceedings.151

144 In re Permanent Houses (Holdings) Ltd, [1988] BCLC 563, 567 (stating that
“there [is] no conceptual reason why the parties should not agree that any specified
event should cause the charge to crystallize”). See also In re Brightlife Ltd., [1987] Ch.
200 at 214–15 (“I do not think it is open to the courts to restrict the contractual
freedom of parties to a floating charge on such grounds. . . . [A]rguments for and
against the floating charge are matters for Parliament rather than the courts . . . [the]
limited and pragmatic interventions by the legislature make it . . . wholly inappropriate for the courts to impose additional restrictive rules . . . .”).
145 LAW COMMISSION, supra note 19, ¶ 2.44 (“Presumably the aim [of automatic
crystallization clauses] is now . . . to preserve the priority of a floating charge as
against subsequent fixed charges.”).
146 FERRAN, supra note 65, at 390 (“[A]n automatic crystallization clause may be
coupled with an express clause entitling its holder to de-crystallize it again.”).
147 For an example of the use of a de-crystallization clause, see the decision of the
High Court of New Zealand in Covacich v. Riordan, [1994] 2 NZLR 502.
148 FERRAN, supra note 65, at 390.
149 Id.
150 GOODE ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CREDIT AND SECURITY ¶ 4-57–59 (Louise Gullifer ed., 4th ed. 2008) [hereinafter GULLIFER, LEGAL PROBLEMS].
151 The statutory period ranges between twelve months and two years ending with
the onset of insolvency (unless new value was given for the charge at the time of its
creation or re-creation). See Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 245.
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A notice-crystallization clause152 gives the creditor more flexibility
over the timing of crystallization and largely removes the need for a
de-crystallization clause. The security agreement identifies events that
give the secured creditor the right to crystallize the floating lien by
giving notice. The secured creditor then decides whether and when
to do so.153 The giving of notice is the crystallization event.
Notice crystallization clauses need not be conditioned upon the
debtor’s breach of a covenant. “Pure” notice crystallization is a procedure by which the creditor may “at any time by notice to the [debtor]
convert the floating charge into a [fixed] charge as regards any asset
specified in the notice.”154 Under English law, if the creditor and a
debtor have agreed upon terms that allow the creditor to crystallize at
will, the court will give effect to their agreement.
To give notice before competitors establish prior rights in the collateral, the secured creditor must know the competitors are about to
do so. Even if the secured creditor engaged in extensive and expensive monitoring, some competitors would succeed in gaining priority.
As is discussed further in Part III, the ease with which secured
creditors can crystallize their floating charges makes it difficult for
third parties to rely on the floating nature of the charge. Because
third parties are reluctant to rely, the debtor’s right to deal freely with
the collateral becomes largely theoretical. Floating charges have the
effect of fixed charges because, as far as third parties know, they may
already have become fixed charges.
III. FIXED CHARGES COMPARED

WITH

SECURITY INTERESTS

In this Part, we compare the function of English fixed charges
with those of American security interests in the contexts of collateral
sales, competitions among security interests, competitions of security
interests with execution creditors, and in insolvency proceedings. We
conclude that English fixed charges and American security interests
function in highly similar manners.

152 For an example of the use of a notice-crystallization clause, see In re Woodroffes (Musical Instruments) Ltd., [1986] Ch. 366, 377–78.
153 FERRAN, supra note 65, at 389–90.
154 In re Brightlife Ltd., [1987] Ch. 200, 207–08 (holding that a clause with the
quoted language was enforceable).
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A. Sale of Collateral
1. Original Collateral
If an English debtor “sells property that is subject to a [fixed]
charge, and the sale is not authorised by the chargee, the buyer will
take subject to the charge.”155 The secured party can then “follow his
asset . . . into the hands of any third party [with certain
exceptions].”156
The American rule is the same. U.C.C. § 9-315(a)(1) provides
that “a security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale,
lease, license, exchange, or other disposition thereof unless the
secured party authorized the disposition free of the security
interest.”157
In both countries, buyers in the ordinary course of business who
buy from the sellers’ inventories take free of security interests in that
inventory. In the English system this result is explained by saying that,
because the charge is against revolving assets, the charge is a floating
charge. By the nature of the charge, the debtor can deal freely with
the collateral. In the American system, this result follows from a statutory rule that a buyer in ordinary course of business takes free of a
security interest created by his seller.158
The English concept of “sale in the ordinary course” is broader
than the corresponding American concept. Under the American concept, only inventory can be sold in the ordinary course of business.
Official Comment 3 to U.C.C § 9-320 states that “subsection (a)
applies primarily to inventory collateral” and the courts generally have
interpreted the section as limited to sales of inventory.159 Narrowing
155 LAW COMMISSION, supra note 56, ¶ 3.49.
If the company sells property that is subject to a charge, and the sale is not
authorised by the [creditor], the buyer will take subject to the charge unless
it [is] protected by one of the exceptions to the principle that a person cannot transfer a better title than he has. The [creditor]’s rights are not affected
and it can enforce its rights against the buyer.
Id. (footnotes omitted)
156 GOODE, supra note 34, at 664.
157 U.C.C. § 9-315(a) (2012). (“(1) a security interest or agricultural lien continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, lease, license, exchange, or other disposition
thereof unless the secured party authorized the disposition free of the security interest or agricultural lien; and
(2) a security interest attaches to any identifiable proceeds of collateral.”)
158 Id. § 9-320(a).
159 Id. § 9-320 cmt. 3. See United States v. Handy & Harman, 750 F.2d 777, 782 n.4
(9th Cir. 1984) (“The official text of U.C.C. §§ 1-201(9) and 9-307(1) (1977) is
worded so that only buyers of goods that are inventory in the hands of the seller can
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the protected categories of buyers even further, the American definition of buyer in ordinary course specifically excludes buyers of bulk
sales of inventory.160
Under the English concept, “capital” or “fixed” assets such as business equipment or licenses can be sold in the ordinary course of business.161 English law is generally highly protective of buyers in the
ordinary course.162 That buyers can buy fixed assets in the ordinary
course of business has led to concern that they might be able to take
free of fixed charges.163 Thus, after noting that “a purchaser (as
opposed to a subsequent chargee) of the company’s assets will not be
put on notice of the charge merely because it has been registered . . .
because a buyer of goods in the ordinary course of business cannot be
expected to search against her seller,”164 the Law Commission
continued:
take the goods free of security interests.”). But see In re Morristown Lincoln-Mercury,
Inc., 25 B.R. 377, 388 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982) (“It is unnecessary for the court to
classify the van as either inventory or non-inventory. The statutory definition of buyer
in the ordinary course of business does not require a conclusion that the goods purchased were inventory. The fact is that Smith purchased a motor vehicle from a seller
in the business of selling goods of that kind.”).
160 A “bulk sale” of inventory is a sale of all or large portion of the debtor’s inventory, at a reduced price, to a competitor or dealer in inventories, rather than to a
customer.
161 See Stevenson v. Rogers, [1999] Q.B. 1028 at 1028 (holding that a sale by a
fisherman of his old working boat was held to be made in course of business within
section 14(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979); Brown, Sales of Goods in the Course of a
Business, (1999) 115 L.Q.R. 384, 387 (“Undeniably, the position adopted in Stevenson
is inflexible: a seller now sells goods in the course of a business where there is an
isolated sale of goods which are not his principal stock-in-trade and other factors such
as regularity of dealing or business proficiency are immaterial.”)
162 Heath v. Crealock, [1874] 10 Ch. App. 22 at 33 (stating that it “is a rule without
exception, that from a purchaser for value without notice this Court takes away nothing which that purchaser has honestly acquired”); Pilcher v. Rawlins, [1872] 7 Ch.
App. 259 at 268–69 (stating that “a purchaser for valuable consideration, without
notice, obtaining, upon the occasion of his purchase, and by means of his purchase
deed, some legal estate, some legal right, some legal advantage; and, according to my
view of the established law of this Court, such a purchaser’s plea of a purchase for
valuable consideration without notice is an absolute, unqualified, unanswerable
defence”).
163 See HUGH BEALE ET AL., THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY SECURITY 435 (2007)
(stating that “[i]t seems generally agreed that purchasers in the ordinary course of
business should not have constructive notice”).
164 LAW COMMISSION, supra note 19, ¶ 2.60. GULLIFER, LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra
note 150, ¶ 2-29 (“[R]egistration is notice only to those who could reasonably be
expected to search. This would normally exclude a buyer in the ordinary course of
business . . . .”).

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-4\NDL402.txt

1818

unknown

Seq: 34

notre dame law review

9-MAY-13

14:32

[vol. 88:4

It may be that in this context a distinction should be drawn between
the purchaser of an item of the company’s normal stock (which is in
any event unlikely to be the subject of a fixed charge) and the purchaser of a capital asset which is sold by the business. It might seem
reasonable to expect the purchaser to check for charges against capital assets. However, it seems to be assumed that, in the context of
floating charges, sales of capital assets are in the ordinary course of
business as much as sales of inventory; and in the context of the Sale
of Goods Act 1979, section 14, the sale of a capital asset has been
held to be in the course of business. Thus it is not clear that this
distinction between purchasers of capital assets and purchasers of
inventory can be maintained.165

If the distinction could not be maintained, buyers of capital assets
in the ordinary course of business would be able to take free of fixed
charges and a sharp functional difference would exist between the
English and American systems.
We can find no direct authority, however, that buyers of capital
assets in the ordinary course can take free of fixed charges. In
Ashborder BV v. Green Gas Power Ltd,166—the only case we can find holding that capital assets can be sold free of a charge in the ordinary
course—the court held the charge over the capital assets to be
floating.
There was a danger in the present case in laying too great an
emphasis on the nature of the assets in question, namely the
licences and the OGL shares. The fact that assets were not part of a
company’s circulating capital or stock in trade, which it needed to
sell as part of its ordinary business, could understandably have an
important influence in the categorisation of a charge as a fixed
charge, rather than a floating charge, in an appropriate case. In the
present case, however, the parties had agreed an express provision
permitting each of the Octagon group companies to dispose of
assets in the ordinary course of its business. The clause in the
debenture assigning rights to the trustee effected an equitable
assignment rather than a legal assignment and an equitable assignment was not inconsistent with a floating charge over the assets
specified. The debentures did not create a fixed charge over the
licences or the OGL shares.167
165 LAW COMMISSION, supra note 19, ¶ 2.61 (footnotes omitted).
166 [2004] EWHC 1517 (Ch). The case contains a detailed discussion of the law
defining “ordinary course of business” per Judge Etherton. Id. at ¶¶ 202, 216, and
227. See also Stevenson v. Rogers, [1999] Q.B. 1028 at 1028 (holding that a sale of a
fishing boat by a fisherman was in the ordinary course of business).
167 Ashborder, [2004] EWHC 1517 (Ch) at 635.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-4\NDL402.txt

unknown

Seq: 35

9-MAY-13

2013] o p t i m i z i n g e n g l i s h a n d a m e r i c a n s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s

14:32

1819

In describing the current state of English law in its final report,
the Law Commission sided more strongly with the fixed charge
holder:
In the [Consultation Paper] we explained that a buyer will take subject to a registered fixed charge, unless the doctrine of a bona fide
purchaser of a legal estate without notice applies. There is some
doubt as to when a purchaser who does not have actual knowledge
of the charge will be put on notice of it because it has been registered. It is possible that a buyer of a capital asset would be expected
to search the register but not one who buys stock-in-trade. We think
that it is desirable to clarify the law by providing that a buyer should
be bound by a registered fixed charge.168

Although expressed with considerable uncertainty, this passage
states, in essence, that current English law is probably the same as
current American law. In both systems “a buyer of a capital asset
would be expected to search the register but not one who buys stockin-trade” and a debtor would be able to sell a capital asset free of the
security interest if the creditor authorized the sale, but not otherwise.169 This interpretation effectively imposes a burden on English
buyers of capital assets in the ordinary course to search for fixed
charges just as American buyers must.170
2. Proceeds
After an authorized disposition, the security interest of both an
American secured creditor and an English fixed charge holder will
continue in any proceeds. On the American side, U.C.C. § 9315(a)(2) states, “a security interest attaches to any identifiable proceeds of collateral.”171 On the English side, the Law Commission has
stated that “if a sale was authorized . . . the [creditor’s] only claim will
be to the proceeds.”172
168 LAW COMMISSION, supra note 56, ¶ 3.217 (footnotes omitted).
169 Id. (footnote omitted).
170 Beale and his coauthors state:
It seems generally agreed that purchasers in the ordinary course of business
should not have constructive notice but it is not entirely clear who are such
purchasers. In particular, it is not clear whether it is limited to purchasers of
stock-in-trade (inventory) or whether it includes purchasers of capital
equipment.
BEALE ET AL., supra note 163, ¶13.04 at 435.
171 U.C.C. § 9-315(a)(2) (2012).
172 LAW COMMISSION, supra note 56, ¶ 3.51 (stating that “[i]f the sale was authorized . . . because the . . . chargee had consented to the particular disposition, the
chargee’s only claim will be to the proceeds”); see also Buhr v. Barclays Bank Place,
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American law and English law take slightly different approaches if
the creditor did not authorize the disposition of the collateral. Under
U.C.C. § 9-315(a), the security interest continues in the collateral and
in any identifiable proceeds of the collateral. The secured creditor
can pursue both and “collect its money where it can” up to the
amount owing.173
Like an American secured creditor, an English law fixed charge
holder initially has an interest in both the original collateral and its
proceeds after an unauthorized disposition.174 However, as soon as
the English secured creditor performs “an unequivocal act showing
that [it] has chosen one [it] cannot afterwards pursue the other.”175
The creditor loses its interest in whichever of the original collateral or
the proceeds was not pursued.176 Therefore, unlike an American
[2001] EWCA Civ. 1223, ¶¶ 11, 39 (quoting Professor Goode and accepting as correct
his statement that “security in an asset extends to the proceeds of sale of an authorized disposition by the debtor”).
173 Professors LoPucki and Warren provide the following example to illustrate
how the value of collateral can multiply upon disposition in the United States:
Nevertheless, the multiplication of collateral that can result from the rules of
U.C.C. §§ 9-102(a)(12) and (64) and 9-315(a) is striking. Assume, for example, that ZBank has a security interest in Jack’s cow. Without authorization
from ZBank, Jack sells the cow to Barbara for $2000. Zbank’s security interest continues in the collateral (the cow) and also in the identifiable proceeds
of that sale (the $2000). If Jack then uses the $2000 of proceeds to buy some
beans, the beans will also be proceeds under U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(64) (recall
that the proceeds of proceeds are proceeds) and Zbank’s security interest
will continue in the beans under U.C.C. § 9-315(a). ZBank can foreclose
against the cow and the beans, and collect its money where it can.
LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 12, at 171.
174 See, e.g., Foskett v. McKeown, [2001] A.C. 102 at 127 (Lord Millett) (stating in
the context of trusts that a beneficiary “is entitled to a continuing beneficial interest
not merely in the trust property but in its traceable proceeds also, and his interest
binds every one who takes the property or its traceable proceeds except a bona fide
purchaser for value without notice”).
175 United Australia, Ltd. v. Barclays Bank, Ltd., [1941] A.C. 1 at 30 (explaining
that when a party has two inconsistent rights an “unequivocal act” showing that it is
pursuing one means that it no longer has the other).
176 The choice of a fixed charge holder between pursuing an interest in the original collateral or in the proceeds has been characterized as one between two inconsistent rights, which cannot both be pursued:
Suppose that C has taken a specific mortgage of D’s motor car and D wrongfully sells the car to E. In the absence of any applicable exception to the
nemo dat rule C can recover his vehicle from E. Alternatively he can adopt
the wrongful sale and treat his security interest as attaching to the proceeds
received by D. But can he claim security in both the car and the proceeds at
the same time? No, because the remedies are inconsistent. C’s equitable
tracing claim to the proceeds rests on his implied adoption of the wrongful
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secured creditor, an English law fixed charge holder is not entitled to
collect the money owed to it “where it can.” Once it has elected to
pursue its interest in either the collateral or the proceeds it loses its
interest in the other.
This distinction between English and American law may seem significant on its face. It is, however, merely a default rule. As the Law
Commission has noted, a creditor need elect between pursuing a right
either in the original collateral or in the proceeds only when the
“charge does not cover the proceeds as a distinct category of asset.”177
According to Professor Ferran, “well-drafted security documentation
will include express provision for the security to cover receivables and
their proceeds.”178 For example, if a debtor sold fixed charge collateral to a buyer on credit, the debt owing from the buyer would be
proceeds. The security agreement would likely provide that the
debtor has charged all debts owing to the debtor to the secured creditor, by way of fixed charge.179 Thus in the example under discussion,
the fixed charge holder would be able to pursue its interest in both
the collateral sold and the debt owing for its purchase price. The
holder’s claim to each would be as original collateral. As a result, we
doubt that the difference in default rules makes a significant difference in the functioning of secured credit in the two jurisdictions.
B. Encumbrance of Collateral
With respect to both American security interests and English
fixed charges, the basic principle governing priority is that first in
time is first in right.180 That is, if the holder of the security interest or
sale. He cannot have his cake and eat it. He must elect which right to
pursue . . . .
GULLIFER, LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 150, ¶ 1-62, at 45-46.
The view that a creditor must elect between pursuing an interest in the collateral and
the original proceeds of an unauthorized disposition has been endorsed by the Court
of Appeal in Buhr v. Barclays Bank Place as “supported by principle and authority.”
[2001] EWCA Civ 1223, ¶ 39.
177 LAW COMMISSION, supra note 56, ¶ 3.50.
178 FERRAN, supra note 65, at 368.
179 See, e.g., GOODE, supra note 34, at 634 (sample credit agreement providing that
the debtor grants a fixed charge in “all trade debts now or in the future owing to you;
all other debts now or in the future owing to you”).
180 See, e.g., FERRAN, supra note 65, at 393 (“[W]here the equities are equal the first
in time prevails. This is the priority rule that governs . . . priority disputes between two
fixed equitable charges on the same property. The charge that was created first has
priority . . . .”“); GULLIFER & PAYNE, supra note 64, at 273 (“The basic priority point in
English law is the date of creation. This is articulated in relation . . . to equitable
interests by the proposition that the first in time has priority.”).
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fixed charge takes whatever steps are necessary to perfect its interest,
the holder will have priority over competitors who establish interests
later.
Both the English and American systems determine the order of
priority by assigning priority dates to each competing interest. That
“priority date” is the date and time when the creditor took some particular step, or one of alternative steps necessary to perfect its interest.
1. Competing Secured Creditors
In competitions between American security interests, the first to
file or perfect has priority. In competitions among English fixed
charges, the first charge created has priority, provided that it is registered within twenty-one days. As was previously discussed, the English
rule creates a period of invisibility. Except with respect to accounts
receivable, the English rule does not cause any other difference in the
functioning of English fixed charges and American security interests.
Both have priority over all later interests, with the exception, in both
systems, of property tax liens.
With respect to priority in accounts receivable as collateral, the
American rule is that the first to file or perfect has priority. Priority
does not depend on notifying the account debtors, and secured creditors rarely notify them unless or until the secured creditors seek direct
payment from them. The English priority rule is that, as between two
charges registered within twenty-one days of their respective dates of
creation, priority goes to the creditor who is first to notify the account
debtor of its charge, regardless of the order in which the charges were
created or registered.181 The effect of the English rule is “that a
receivables financier must make enquiries of the ‘account debtor,’
and notify the debtor of the arrangement, or risk losing out to a second financier.”182 The ultimate effect is that English account financiers will give individual notice to each account debtor, while
American account financiers will merely file a financing statement.
Individual notice may be of some benefit to English account debtors who would not have taken the time to run searches. But the costs
of providing individual notice may be greater than the benefits, and
181 Dearle v. Hall, [1827] 38 ER 475, 482–83 (stating that the order in which creditors notify the account debtor determines the priority of competing claims over
accounts receivable); LAW COMMISSION, supra note 19, ¶ 2.48 (“Where the assets
charged are debts, provided again that the charge is registered in the Companies
Register within 21 days of its creation, priority depends on the date of notice to the
debtor.”) (footnote omitted).
182 LAW COMMISSION, supra note 56, ¶ 14.
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the Law Commission had no difficulty in reaching a recommendation
that England adopt the American rule.183 Aside from the additional
costs of the English rule, we see no significant difference in system
operation and no policy issue for resolution.
2. Lien Creditors
In both England and the United States, the basic principle is that
fixed charges, American security interests, and execution liens rank in
order of time. A security interest or fixed charge with an earlier priority date has priority over an execution lien with a later priority date.
For example, with respect to English fixed charges, Gough states:
An execution creditor takes subject to previous legal and equitable
interests in the property of the debtor, arising through disposition
by the debtor or otherwise. This is true in respect of execution by a
writ fieri facias over goods . . . . The rule applies regardless of
whether the execution creditor has had notice of the prior interest . . . . [T]he priority issue is simply whether or not that proprietary interest exists at the relevant priority point in execution.184

As one court put it, the “sheriff cannot by seizing [the collateral]
get rid of the rights of third persons to which the property is subject
when in the hands of the debtor.”185 Thus, once perfected, security
interests and fixed charges have priority over later executions.
Executions that predated the security interest or charge would, in
theory, have priority over the security interest or charge. However,
that rarely occurs. Judgments and executions are public records in
both countries. Lenders conduct due diligence to discover and clear
any judgments against their borrowers and executions against proposed collateral.
C. Rights in Insolvency Proceedings
Both English and American insolvency laws generally yield to and
enforce the non-insolvency rights of security interest holders.186 The
183 See id. ¶ 15.
184 WILLIAM JAMES GOUGH, COMPANY CHARGES 13 (2d ed. 1996); see also LAW COMMISSION, supra note 56, ¶ 3.201 (“Under current law, an execution creditor cannot
seize property that is subject to a duly registered fixed charge.”).
185 In re Standard Mfg. Co, [1891] 1 Ch. 627 at 641. See also GOUGH, supra note
184, at 13 (discussing priority over personal claims).
186 E.g., Tidewater Fin. Co. v. Moffett, 356 F.3d 518, 521 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Yet,
while federal law defines in broad fashion what property interests are included within
the bankruptcy estate, state law determines the nature and existence of a debtor’s
rights.”); ROY GOODE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 69 (3d ed. 2005)
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creditor’s “secured claim” is defined in the United States as the
amount of the debt owed to the creditor that is secured by collateral.187 Any excess over the value of the collateral is treated as an
unsecured claim and will rank pro-rata with the claims of other
unsecured creditors.188 English law takes the same approach. A creditor has a “secured claim” for purposes of insolvency law “to the extent
that [the creditor] holds any security for the debt . . . over any property of the person by whom the debt is owed.”189 If the creditor “realizes [its] security [it] may prove for the balance of [its] debt, after
deducting the amount realized”190 for which it will rank pro-rata
along with the unsecured creditors.191
Both systems, however, also modify those rights in some respects.
In this section, we compare the functions of English fixed charges and
American security interests in connection with insolvency proceedings. Although general differences in the insolvency procedures of
the two countries may indirectly affect secured creditor recoveries, we
confine our discussion to differences that directly affect secured creditor recoveries.
(stating as the “first principle” that English “corporate insolvency law recognizes
rights accrued under the general law prior to liquidation”).
187 See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2006).
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the
estate has an interest . . . is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such
creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property . . . and is an
unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor’s interest . . . is
less than the amount of such allowed claim.
Id.
188 See id.
189 Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 383(2).
Subject to the next two subsections and any provision of the rules requiring
a creditor to give up his security for the purposes of proving a debt, a debt is
secured for the purposes of this Group of Parts to the extent that the person
to whom the debt is owed holds any security for the debt (whether a mortgage, charge, lien or other security) over any property of the person by
whom the debt is owed.
Id.
190 The treatment of the debtor’s unsecured claim is set out in two identical provisions of the Insolvency Rules, 1986, c. 45 § 2.83, which applies in administration, and
§ 4.88, which applies in liquidation; both provide: “If a secured creditor realises his
security, he may prove for the balance of his debt, after deducting the amount realised.” Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, §§ 2.83, 4.88.
191 The pari passu nature of unsecured debt is set out in the Insolvency Act, 1986,
c. 45, § 328(3) (“Debts which are neither preferential debts nor debts to which the
next section applies also rank equally between themselves and, after the preferential
debts, shall be paid in full unless the bankrupt’s estate is insufficient for meeting
them, in which case they abate in equal proportions between themselves.”).
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In the United States, three proceedings are commonly employed
by business debtors: (1) Chapter 7 (liquidation), (2) Chapter 11
(reorganization), and (3) Chapter 13 (debt adjustment). We omit
Chapter 13 debt adjustment from our comparison, because only individuals (natural persons) can file under Chapter 13.
In England, four proceedings are commonly employed by business debtors: (1) Winding-up (liquidation), (2) Administration (reorganization), (3) Administrative Receivership (reorganization), and
(4) Bankruptcy (distribution of bankrupt’s estate and discharge).192
We omit Administrative Receivership from our comparison, because
recent legislation has sharply curtailed its use.193 We also omit Bankruptcy from our comparison, because a bankruptcy order can only be
made against individuals (natural persons).194
Thus, following Segal,195 we make essentially two comparisons.
The first is of liquidation under American Chapter 7 with English
Winding-up. The second is of reorganization under American Chapter 11 with English Administration.
In theory, floating charges crystallize upon the commencement
of an insolvency proceeding and so become fixed charges. But for
purposes of insolvency proceedings, the metamorphosis seems to
make little difference. The Insolvency Act defines a floating charge as
a charge that was a floating charge at the time of its creation,196 and
continues to treat the floating charge differently in many respects.
Accordingly, in this section we compare the insolvency treatment of
charges that were created as fixed charges with American security
interests. The comparison of charges that were created as floating
charges with American security interests is the subject of Part IV.C.
below. There are, nevertheless, many respects in which floating
charges are treated the same as fixed charges. For economy of presentation, we mention some of them here.
192 Individuals carrying on businesses are eligible to file bankruptcy. Insolvency
Act, 1986, c. 45, § 265 (referring to bankrupts “carrying on of business”).
193 See GULLIFER & PAYNE, supra note 64, at 285 (“[T]he official statistics show[ ] a
rapid drop-off in [administrative] receiverships after [15 September] 2003 [the date
on which the relevant provisions of the Enterprise Act 2002 entered into force], coupled with a rapid rise in administrations, indicating that charges were preferring to
appoint an administrator rather than an administrative receiver, even [in the limited
circumstances in which they continue to have] the right to do so.”).
194 Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 264(1) (“A petition for a bankruptcy order to be
made against an individual may be presented to the court in accordance with the
following provisions of this Part . . . .”).
195 Segal, supra note 28, at 933 (“I have focused on the operation and effect of the
administration and Chapter 11 regimes as they relate to secured creditors . . . .”).
196 See supra note 97
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The insolvency treatment of English fixed charges is highly similar to the insolvency treatment of American security interests. We
describe the similarities in subsection 1 before we turn to the differences in subsection 2.
1. Similarities in Treatment
Initiation. Secured creditors commonly initiate English insolvency proceedings.197 They seldom do so directly in the United
States. In the United States, unsecured creditors—which include
secured creditors for the amounts by which their claims exceed the
amounts of their collateral—have the legal right to initiate “involuntary” insolvency cases.198 But American law is hostile toward direct
creditor-initiation. Creditor petitions probably account for fewer than
three percent of American business bankruptcies.199
This difference in the ability of English and American secured
creditors to directly initiate insolvency proceedings is, however, of little functional importance. Once the debtor is in default, an American
secured creditor can force the debtor to file a “voluntary” petition by
moving against the collateral, or merely threatening to move against
the collateral. For example, an American creditor with a security
interest in accounts can notify account debtors to pay the secured
creditor directly, thus depriving the debtor of its cash flow.200 An
American creditor with a security interest in goods can file an action
for replevin and probably have the sheriff poised to seize the debtor’s
property within ten to twenty days.201 The debtor must then file a
197 Goode states:
In the normal case, administration is initiated by the appointment of an
administrator by the holder of a qualifying floating charge . . . . The alternative route to administration is the appointment of an administrator by the
court on application by the company, the directors, one or more creditors . . . or a combination of these persons.
GOODE, supra note 34, at 928–29. (footnotes omitted).
198 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) (2006) (specifying the unsecured creditors eligible to file
an involuntary petition).
199 LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 12, at 94 (reporting otherwise unpublished
finding of Warren and Westbrook).
200 U.C.C. § 9-607(a) (2012) (“If so agreed, and in any event after default, a
secured party . . . may notify an account debtor . . . to make payment . . . to or for the
benefit of the secured party . . . .”); U.C.C. § 9-406(a) (“After receipt of the notification, the account debtor may discharge its obligation by paying the assignee and may
not discharge the obligation by paying the assignor.”).
201 E.g., Del’s Big Saver Foods, Inc. v. Carpenter Cook, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 1071
(W.D. Wis. 1985) (writ of replevin issued and served on the same day the case was
filed).
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“voluntary” bankruptcy to avoid the seizure. Thus, although they use
different devices, secured creditors commonly initiate both English
and American insolvency proceedings.
Automatic stay. In both England202 and the United States,203 the
filing of an insolvency case stays the efforts of secured creditors to
collect the debts owing to them, except through the insolvency case.
In both systems, secured creditors are entitled to protection against
loss resulting from the delay in realizing their collateral.204 In both
systems, secured creditors can petition the insolvency court for relief
from the stay.205
202 In administration, the Insolvency Act of 1986 provides: “No legal process
(including legal proceedings, execution, distress and diligence) may be instituted or
continued against the company or property of the company except—(a) with the
consent of the administrator, or (b) with the permission of the court.” Insolvency
Act, 1986, c. 45, sch. B1 ¶ 43(6). Goode states that:
The effect of administration, whether out of court or by court order, is to
place an almost total freeze on the enforcement of real and personal rights,
including enforcement of security rights, rights of repossession under hirepurchase agreements, a landlord’s right of forfeiture, or any legal process,
including proceedings, execution or distress, except with the consent of the
administrator or the approval of the court.
GOODE, supra note 34, at 930. Segal argues that:
The automatic stay resulting from the commencement of either a Chapter
11 or an administration proceeding are broadly similar as they relate to
secured creditors. Still, the ambit of the Chapter 11 stay is clearly wider in a
number respects. In particular, it protects the debtor from informal acts to
recover pre-petition claims.
Segal, supra note 28, at 929.
In liquidation, the Insolvency Act of 1986 provides: “When a winding-up order has
been made or a provisional liquidator has been appointed, no action or proceeding
shall be proceeded with or commenced against the company or its property, except
by leave of the court and subject to such terms as the court may impose.” Insolvency
Act, 1986, c. 45, § 130(2).
203 In the United States, Bankruptcy Code § 362(a) enacts a stay “applicable to all
entities” which prohibits “any act” to collect a pre-bankruptcy debt. 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a) (2006). Section 362(d) provides that secured creditors can move to lift the
stay if there is no equity in the collateral or if it is not necessary for an effective reorganization. Id. § 362(d).
204 Segal, supra note 28, at 929 (“[W]hile both jurisdictions allow secured creditors relief from the automatic stay on broadly similar grounds, the adequate protection doctrine is more clearly articulated under the Bankruptcy Code.”).
205 English law gives the court wide discretion in determining whether to grant
relief:
The court is given a general discretion and, in accordance with ordinary
principles, it must have regard to all relevant circumstances. If, having
regard to those circumstances, it can be seen to be appropriate that the
secured creditor should be given leave to enforce its security, then, even if
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After-acquired property. After-acquired property, as the term is used
here, refers to property that the debtor acquires after the commencement of the insolvency case and that fits within the security agreement
description of collateral. In American insolvency proceedings, property acquired after the commencement of the case is not the secured
creditor’s collateral. Bankruptcy Code § 552(a) provides that
“[P]roperty acquired by the estate or by the debtor after the commencement of the case is not subject to any lien resulting from any
security agreement entered into by the debtor before the commencement of the case.”206 Such property is, however, subject to such a lien
if it is also the proceeds, products, offspring, profits, or rents of collateral in existence at the time the insolvency proceeding was filed.207
The purpose of the American rules is to distinguish situations in
which the after-acquired property represents the value of the secured
creditor’s prepetition collateral, from situations in which the new
value is contributed by the debtor’s estate.208
English law makes essentially the same distinction in Winding-up
proceedings. As Professor Goode states:
So firmly is this principle [that security interests created prior to the
insolvency proceeding are unaffected by the winding up] applied
that where the instrument of charge provides for security in afteracquired property the secured creditor can assert rights even over
moneys or other assets falling in after the commencement of the
winding-up, provided that the consideration for these was already executed
before that time, as opposed to being furnished by the liquidator himself, e.g.,
by performance of a contract entered into by the company.209
there be no criticism capable of being made of the administrator, I do not
see why leave should not be given.
Royal Trust Bank v. Buchler (Re Meesan Inv. Ltd.), [1989] BCLC 130, [1988] BCC
788 (Ch. D. 1988).
Segal described English law as “without any statutory explanation as to how the discretion should be exercised,” and acknowledges that “while both jurisdictions allow
secured creditors relief from the automatic stay on broadly similar grounds, the adequate protection doctrine is more clearly articulated under the Bankruptcy Code.”
Segal, supra note 28, at 929.
206 11 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2006).
207 Id. § 552(b).
208 See LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 12, at 182–93; see, e.g., In re Wiegmann, 95
B.R. 90, 94 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1989) (“The lender is entitled to the same percentage of
the proceeds of the post-petition milk as its capital contribution to the production of
the milk bears to the total of the capital and direct operating expenses incurred in
producing the milk.”) (citing In re Delbridge, 61 B.R. 484, 491 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1986)).
209 GOODE, supra note 186, at 72 (emphasis added).
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Doctrinally, English law reaches this result through the construct
that assets in the hands of a liquidator in Winding-up are subject to a
statutory trust and so the company never becomes the beneficial
owner of the after-acquired property.210
Although authority with respect to fixed charges in Administration is sparse, Segal describes the scope of the English charge holder’s
right in after-acquired property as broader than the corresponding
American right: “[W]here a post-petition product is made using assets
or cash not previously subject to the lender’s security interest, the new
product will not be subject to the lender’s lien. This is different from
the position in an English administration . . . .”211 Segal does not say
how, but does confirm that “the practical significance of the differences between the two systems is limited.”212
If we include authority regarding floating liens, the picture is
clearer. The English statute addressing the sale of floating charge collateral employs the term “acquired property” essentially to mean “proceeds.” The statute provides:
§ 70 (1) The administrator of a company may dispose of or take
action relating to property which is subject to a floating charge as if
it were not subject to the charge.
(2) Where property is disposed of in reliance on sub-paragraph (1)
the holder of the floating charge shall have the same priority in
respect of acquired property as he had in respect of the property
disposed of.

210 See Segal, supra note 28, at 931 (“[A]n English winding up . . . divests the
debtor of the beneficial interest [in] its property. It is at least arguable that upon the
commencement of the winding up, such assets become subject to a statutory trust so
that products created therefrom or their proceeds are not property of the debtor to
which the security interest can attach.”) (footnote omitted). See also In re Collins,
[1925] Ch. 556 (Eng.) (holding that monies to be earned in the course of business
were included in bankruptcy); Ayerst (Inspector of Taxes) v. C. & K. Constr. Ltd.,
[1976] A.C. 167, 178 (“[A] person could only be the legal owner without being at the
same time the beneficial owner in cases where it was possible to identify some other
person or persons in whom the beneficial ownership had become vested. Executorship of an estate during administration provides one example . . . .”); GOODE, supra
note 186, at 72 n.13 (stating that when the liquidator receives money as a result of
procuring performance on the company’s contract this money does not fall into the
after acquired property clause). Segal is less supportive of our thesis elsewhere in his
article. See, e.g., Segal, supra note 28, at 955 (“The after acquired property clause is
effective to catch property coming into the company’s hands after the commencement of the winding up . . . .”).
211 Segal, supra note 28, at 930–31.
212 Id. at 930.
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(3) In sub-paragraph (2) “acquired property” means property of
the company which directly or indirectly represents the property
disposed of.213

Under this provision, a floating charge holder retains its priority
date only with respect to property “which directly or indirectly represents the property disposed of.”214 That is essentially the American
concept of “proceeds.” Segal’s example confirms this interpretation:
Accordingly, if the administrator, for example, sells plant machinery
subject to the floating charge, the proceeds of the sale will fall
within the floating charge and the holder of the charge will be entitled to the same priority as against third parties (e.g., holders of
subsequent floating charges) in respect of the proceeds as he had
over the disposed of plant machinery.215

Thus, the distinction that after acquired property clauses continue to operate in English insolvency proceedings but cease to operate in American insolvency proceedings may make no difference.
Whether the charge is fixed or floating, the English charge holder,
like the American secured creditor, has effectively only the right to
proceeds of its collateral during insolvency proceedings.
Administrators. In a Chapter 7 liquidation case the United States
Trustee, a government official, appoints a disinterested trustee to
administer the liquidation. In a voluntary Winding-up, the debtor
appoints a liquidator;216 in an involuntary Winding-up the creditors
appoint a liquidator.217 The objectives of the three kinds of cases are
similar: to liquidate the debtor’s property and distribute it in accord
with statutory priorities.218 In Administration, a “qualified insolvency
practitioner”—typically an accounting firm chosen by the qualifying
floating charge holder who initiates the proceeding—is placed in con213 Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, sch. B1, ¶ 70.
214 Id.
215 Segal, supra note 28, at 961 (footnote omitted).
216 Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45, § 91(1) (“In a members’ voluntary winding up,
the company in general meeting shall appoint one or more liquidators for the purpose of winding up the company’s affairs and distributing its assets.”).
217 Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45, § 100(1), (2) (“The creditors and the company at
their respective meetings . . . may nominate a person to be liquidator for the purpose
of winding up the company’s affairs and distributing its assets . . . . The liquidator
shall be the person nominated by the creditors . . . .”).
218 E.g., GOODE, supra note 186, ¶ 1-24, at 24 (“The principal role of the liquidator
is to collect in and realise the assets, ascertain claims, investigate the causes of failure[,] and, after covering the expenses of the liquidation, to distribute the net proceeds by way of dividend to creditors in the order of priority laid down by the
Insolvency Act and the Insolvency Rules.”).
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trol.219 The administrator has the power to remove and appoint
directors.220 In Chapter 11, the debtor’s managers formally remain in
office, and administer the reorganization. But this formal difference
is mitigated by practices in both countries. In England, the administrator may retain the debtor’s management in a subordinate position.
And in the United States, the debtor-in-possession’s attorneys—who
must pledge loyalty to the debtor company, not its managers221—
sometimes arrange with creditors for the managers’ and directors’
removal.222 Despite these mitigations, we think managers do have
greater control in American Chapter 11 cases than in English
Administrations.
The two proceedings nevertheless remain similar in fundamental
respects. Although left in control, the American debtor-in-possession
is a fiduciary bound to act in the interests of all parties.223 The same is
true of the English administrator.224 During the insolvency proceedings, both are obligated to serve as “neutrals,” working in the interests
of all parties.225
Sale of collateral. English administrators and liquidators and
American debtors in possession and trustees all have the practical abil219 GOODE, supra note 34, at 929 (“The holder of a qualifying floating charge has
first choice in appointing an administrator.”); Segal, supra note 28, at 944 (“[T]he
holder of a qualifying floating charge is given the right to appoint an administrator,
chosen by him, merely by serving a notice at court with the requisite statutory
declaration.”).
220 GOODE, supra note 186, at 369.
221 See, e.g., In re KenDavis Indus. Int’l, Inc., 91 B.R. 742, 762 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1988) (requiring debtors’ attorneys to disgorge two million dollars in fees because
they had represented the interests of the debtors’ principals rather than the interests
of the debtor company).
222 For example, the debtor-in-possession’s attorneys in Enron describe a management succession process in which they, not the debtors’ board, chose the new CEO:
“Ken Lay did not choose a successor. The Enron statutory creditors’ committee
named two potential successors, neither of whom Ken Lay knew, and Enron’s attorneys selected Stephen F. Cooper from that list.” Martin J. Bienenstock et al., Response
to “Routine Illegality in Bankruptcy Court, Big-Case Fee Practices,” 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 549,
552 (2009).
223 See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Weaver, 680 F.2d 451, 462 n.8 (6th Cir. 1982)
(“A trustee in bankruptcy or a debtor in possession, as a fiduciary, represents both the
secured and unsecured creditors of the debtor.”).
224 See Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45, sch. B1, ¶ 3(2) (requiring that “the administrator of a company must perform his functions in the interests of the company’s creditors as a whole”); Royal Trust Bank v. Buchler (Re Meesan Invs. Ltd.), [1989] BCLC
130, [1988] BCC 788 (“The administrator has to have regard to the interests not only
of secured creditors but also of unsecured creditors.”).
225 See Westbrook, supra note 24, at 825 (arguing that “neutrality” of the administrator is a “core idea” of a bankruptcy priority regime).
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ity to sell secured creditors’ collateral for a price in excess of the
amount of the secured debt. That is because, in both the English and
American systems, the debtor is entitled to redeem the collateral from
the security interest by paying the full amount owing.226 In addition,
American insolvency law specifically authorizes sale of the collateral
free of liens if the sale price exceeds the “value of the liens:”
The trustee may sell property . . . free and clear of any interest in
such property of an entity other than the estate, only if . . . such
entity consents; [or] such interest is a lien and the price at which
such property is to be sold is greater than the aggregate value of all
liens on such property . . . .227

Sale of the collateral by the administrator for more than the
amount of the secured obligation will, in both systems, entitle the
secured creditor to payment in full. To the extent estates can sell free
of security interests in either system, they can do so only with court
approval.228
In the English system, an administrator can sell the collateral free
of a fixed charge for a price that is less than the amount owing to the
secured creditor provided that the price is at least the market value of
the property.229 It appears that a liquidator cannot.230
226 See supra note 96 (presenting English and American authority for the right to
redeem).
227 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(2)–(3) (2012).
228 For the United States, see 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (“The trustee, after notice
and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business,
property of the estate . . . . .”). For England, see BEALE ET AL., supra note 163, ¶ 15.11,
at 528–29 (“The administrator has power to dispose of these assets for the purposes of
the administration but, except in the case of floating charge assets, must first apply to
the court for permission to do so.”).
229 Insolvency Act, 1986, Schedule B1 ¶ 71 provides in relevant part:
(1) The court may by order enable the administrator of a company to dispose of property which is subject to a security (other than a floating charge)
as if it were not subject to the security.
(2) An order under sub-paragraph (1) may be made only—
(a) on the application of the administrator, and
(b) where the court thinks that disposal of the property would be likely
to promote the purpose of administration in respect of the company.
(3) An order under this paragraph is subject to the condition that there be
applied towards discharging the sums secured by the security—
(a) the net proceeds of disposal of the property, and
(b) any additional money required to be added to the net proceeds so
as to produce the amount determined by the court as the net amount
which would be realised on a sale of the property at market value.
Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45, sch. B1, ¶ 17.
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In the American system, no distinction is made between reorganization and liquidation. The majority rule is that neither debtors-inpossession nor trustees can sell collateral free of a security interest for
a price less than the face amounts owing the secured creditors.231
Thus, English law differs from American law principally in the
ability of English administrators to sell for less than the amounts of
the liens. As we explain below, we consider this difference to be compensatory for the English lack of cramdown.
Insolvency Priorities. Both English and American insolvency laws
create priorities in favor of certain classes of creditors. They include
administrative expenses and certain debts owing to employees. But
these priorities are not priorities over English fixed charges or American security interests.
In an insolvency proceeding under English law:
[A] secured creditor is not a contender in the priority stakes.
Assuming his security to be valid against the liquidator and creditors, he is entitled to have recourse to it before anyone else. Even
the costs of the liquidation cannot be taken out of an asset given as
security before the secured creditor has realized what is necessary to
pay his debt.232

As will be discussed in Part IV.C. below, floating charges are
subordinate to administrative expenses, preferential creditors, and an
unsecured creditors’ prescribed share, but fixed charges are senior to
all creditors except prior fixed charges.
The same is true of security interests in American insolvency proceedings. Security interests are senior to expenses of administration,
creditors with statutory bankruptcy priorities, and unsecured
creditors.233
230 GOODE, supra note 186, at 71 (“As a corollary of the rule that only the company’s assets are available for its creditors, the liquidator has no power as liquidator to
sell assets not beneficially owned by the company or subject to a security
interest . . . .”).
231 The sale must meet one of the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 363(f). See Clear
Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Knupfer (In re PW, LLC), 391 B.R. 25, 29 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
2008) (holding that a sale meets the requirement of § 363(f)(3) only if it is for the
face amount of the lien); In re Boston Generating, LLC, 440 B.R. 302, 331 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that a sale meets the requirement of § 363(f)(3) if it is for
the collateral’s fair value).
232 GOODE, supra note 34, at 914 (footnotes omitted).
233 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 507.02[4][a] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2011) (“The rights of holders of priority claims are subject to the
rights of holders of liens against property. The right to priority does not grant or
imply any right to affect the rights of holders of secured claims . . . .”).
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Expenses of collateral preservation and disposition. In both the United
States and England, insolvency administrators often incur expenses in
preserving and disposing of secured creditors’ collateral. Under
American law, the estate—and the unsecured creditors claiming
through the estate—generally bear these expenses. The expenses are
imposed on the secured creditor only “to the extent of any benefit to
the holder of [the secured] claim.”234
To illustrate the operation of this “benefit” test, assume that the
trustee incurs expenses of $10,000 in preserving and selling an asset
for $100,000, and that the asset is subject to a security interest in the
amount of $75,000. The trustee cannot recover the $10,000 from the
secured creditor’s $75,000 share of the proceeds because the expenditures do not benefit the secured creditor. They do not benefit the
secured creditor because, even if the trustee had not incurred them,
the secured creditor would have incurred them, added them to the
amount of the secured debt,235 and collected the entire $85,000
through foreclosure. Thus, whether the trustee spends the $10,000 or
the secured creditor spends the $10,000 and adds it to the amount of
the secured debt, the ultimate outcome is the same. The expenses are
paid, the secured creditor receives $75,000 and the estate receives
$15,000.236
If, instead, the amount of the secured debt had been $100,000,
the trustee would have been able to recover the $10,000 from the
$100,000 proceeds of sale. That is because the expenditures would
have benefitted the secured creditor. The expenditures would have
done so because, if the trustee had not paid them, the secured creditor would have had to pay them. The secured creditor could not have
recouped them by adding them to the debt and collecting them from
the sale proceeds, because the sale proceeds would have been insufficient to pay both the costs and the secured debt. As one American
court put it in holding a trustee entitled to recover the commission it
234 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (2006). The entire provision reads:
(c) The trustee may recover from property securing an allowed secured
claim the reasonable, necessary costs and expenses of preserving, or disposing of, such property to the extent of any benefit to the holder of such claim,
including the payment of all ad valorem property taxes with respect to the
property.
Id.
235 Security agreements generally provide that expenses of preserving a selling collateral are included in the secured obligation.
236 LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 12, at 120–22 (presenting a similar example
regarding the sale process of an asset and assignment of the sale expenses).
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paid to a broker to sell the collateral of such an undersecured
creditor:
[In bankruptcy,] Twin City did not have to foreclose on the property and incur the financial burdens, and time burdens, that are
usually associated with such action. Instead, Twin City was freed
from these problems by virtue of the broker’s prompt disposition of
the property. Further, had Twin city lifted the stay and taken possession of the realty and the personalty, it would have had to sell
same and pay its broker a commission also.237

Thus, on the facts of this example, the trustee recovers the
$10,000 in expenses from the sale proceeds and the remaining
$90,000 goes to the secured creditor.
English law does not make the benefit distinction expressly. The
express rule is that “[t]he [administrator or liquidator] receives his
fees and costs incurred in realising assets subject to a fixed charge
from the sale proceeds of the assets in question, rather than from the
assets available to the creditors of the company as a whole.”238 But the
English and American formulations are sufficiently similar that they
produce the same result on the facts of our two prototypical examples.
In the first of those examples, the administrator or liquidator incurs
$10,000 in expenses to sell collateral encumbered by a fixed charge in
the amount of $75,000 for $100,000. We take the English authorities
to mean that the first $10,000 of the proceeds of sale go to reimburse
the administrator or liquidator.239 The next $75,000 goes to the fixed
charge holder and the remaining $15,000 goes to the estate—the
same result as under American law.
In the second example—a fixed charge of $100,000 against collateral sold for $100,000—the administrator or liquidator would again
take the first $10,000 of proceeds to reimburse the expenses of liquidation. The fixed charge holder receives the remaining $90,000—
237 In re Wine Boutique, Inc., 117 B.R. 506, 508–09 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1990).
238 Practical Law Company, How Are Assets Distributed to Creditors in Corporate Insolvency Procedures?, available at http://www.practicallaw.com/5-422-4145 (last visited Jan.
18, 2013); see also Insolvency Rules, 1986, S.I. 1986/1925, § 2.92 (in administration)
(“(3) If the administrator redeems the security, the cost of transferring it is payable
out of the assets.”); id. § 4.97 (in liquidation) (“(3) If the liquidator redeems the
security, the cost of transferring it is payable [out of the assets].”).
239 See In re Berkeley Applegate (Inv. Consultants) Ltd. (No. 3), [1989] 5 B.C.C.
803, 805, per Gibson L.J. (“[E]xpenses that are referred to as being incurred in the
winding up cannot be expenses in relation to what are not assets of the company.”);
GOODE, supra note 186, ¶ 7-23, at 192 (“It is well established that where [an administrator or] a liquidator incurs expense in preserving or realising assets for the benefit
of a third party, for example, where he sells assets subject to a security interest, the
costs are to be recouped from the proceeds recovered for the benefit of that party.”).

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-4\NDL402.txt

1836

unknown

Seq: 52

notre dame law review

9-MAY-13

14:32

[vol. 88:4

again yielding the same result as under American law. Thus although
the reasoning is different in the two systems, they seem to allocate the
expenses of collateral preservation and disposition in essentially the
same manner.
The remaining difference between the two systems is that the
American system addresses the possibility of a difference in the price
that the secured creditor and the bankruptcy administrator can get
for the property. Assume, for example, that the secured creditor held
a $75,000 security interest in collateral that the administrator could
sell for $100,000 along with other estate property, but that the secured
creditor could sell for only $70,000. If the administrator sold the collateral for $100,000, the secured creditor would be entitled to $75,000
under the English rule, but only $70,000 under the American rule.
Under the American rule, the trustee could “recover from property
securing an allowed secured claim”—that is, from the secured creditor’s share of the proceeds—”the reasonable, necessary . . . expenses
of . . . disposing of[ the] property to the extent of any benefit to the
[secured creditor]”240—that is, the $5000 that the secured creditor
could not have recovered without the trustee’s intervention.
2. Differences in Treatment
The treatment of fixed charges in English insolvency cases does
differ significantly from the treatment of security interests in American insolvency cases in two important respects.
Cramdown. American security interests are subject to modification in Chapter 11 cases through “cramdown.” Cramdown is typically
the substitution of a new debt for the previously secured debt.241 The
new debt may be in a smaller amount or payable on a different schedule with interest at a different rate, provided that the present value of
the new debt is equal to the lesser of the amount of the previously
secured debt or the value of the collateral.242 The secured creditor is
entitled to retain its lien.243
240 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (2006).
241 See id. § 1129(b)(2)(A).
242 The relevant Code section requires that:
With respect to a class of secured claims, the plan provides . . . that each
holder of a claim of such class receive on account of such claim deferred
cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount of such claim, of a value,
as of the effective date of the plan, of at least the value of such holder’s
interest in the estate’s interest in such property . . . .
Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II).
243 Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) (requiring that “the holders of [secured] claims
retain the liens securing such claims”).
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Segal points out that “[i]n England, in an administration and
company voluntary arrangement (CVA), the secured creditor’s right
to enforce his security is entrenched and cannot be prejudiced by the
administrator’s proposals or the terms of the CVA, without the consent of the secured creditor.”244 Segal concludes, “English law does
not have a true equivalent to the cram-down that arises in Chapter 11
proceedings.”245
English law does, nevertheless, have a functional equivalent. The
administrator can sell the collateral.246 To understand the
equivalency, consider the example of a debtor that owns $500,000 in
collateral that is subject to a security interest in the amount of
$900,000. In an American Chapter 11 case, the debtor in possession
could propose a plan that paid the secured creditor $500,000 plus
interest at the market rate, treated the remaining $400,000 in the
same manner as other unsecured claims, comply with the absolute priority rule by cancelling the equity, and cram the plan down over the
secured creditor’s objection.247 In an English Administration, the
administrator could, with the court’s approval, sell the collateral for
$500,000 on credit, transfer the fixed charge to proceeds of sale, and
treat the remaining $400,000 as an unsecured claim. The sale need
not be to a third party. It can be a “phoenix sale”248 to a shell corpo-

244 Segal, supra note 28, at 932.
245 Id.
246 See supra notes 229–230 and accompanying text.
247 The Chapter 11 requirement is that:
With respect to a class of secured claims, the plan provides—
(i)(I) that the holders of such claims retain the liens securing such claims,
whether the property subject to such liens is retained by the debtor or transferred to another entity, to the extent of the allowed amount of such claims;
and
(II) that each holder of a claim of such class receive on account of such
claim deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount of such
claim, of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, of at least the value of
such holder’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property . . . .
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A). Under 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(2), a secured creditor can
elect to have its entire claim treated as secured and be paid the secured amount. But
the debtor can pay it without interest over time, with the result that the secured creditor is usually not entitled to any more value. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II).
248 The term “phoenix sale” generally refers to the “tendency for a bankrupt business to start up again under a new ‘identity’ with the same owners.” INT’L ASS’N OF
INSOLVENCY REGULATORS, THE REGULATION OF PHOENIX COMPANIES 5 (2004), available
at http://www.insolvencyreg.org/sub_publications/docs/Report%20on%20Phoenix
%20Companies%20Final41029.pdf.
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ration owned by the same persons who own the debtor.249 The two
transactions produce identical results.
Thus, both the English and the American systems accept the basic
principle that a secured creditor should not be able to prevent a
restructuring that benefits others without harming the secured creditor. In the American system, the debtor can retain the collateral. In
the English system, the debtor must sell the collateral, but the sale can
be to the debtor’s principals.
Priming. In the English system, the administrator cannot grant
liens with priority over pre-existing fixed charges. With respect to
English Administration, Segal notes:
[W]here the administrator needs to borrow funds for the purpose
of the [A]dministration, these provisions allow him to do so, and to
create new, post-[A]dministration security interests, with priority
over pre-[A]dministration floating charge assets. However, there is
no ability to prime and subordinate assets subject to a pre[A]dministration fixed charge.250

In the American system, the administrator can grant such liens
with priority over a pre-existing security interests.
(d)(1) The court, after notice and a hearing, may authorize the
obtaining of credit or the incurring of debt secured by a senior or
equal lien on property of the estate that is subject to a lien only if—
(A) the trustee is unable to obtain such credit otherwise; and
(B) there is adequate protection of the interest of the holder of the
lien on the property of the estate on which such senior or equal lien
is proposed to be granted.251

To grant a priming lien, the American debtor-in-possession or
trustee must obtain court approval and must provide adequate protection against resulting loss to the holder of the security interest. But
the secured creditor nevertheless may suffer uncompensated losses if
the protection turns out to be inadequate. For that reason, this power
249 See Adam Gallagher & Margaret Rhodes, Pre-pack Sales in the U.K.: Smoke Without
Fire, AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 2009, at 38 (“The purchaser will sometimes be an unconnected third party, but often it will be a special-purpose vehicle owned by the secured
creditors or the owner of the failing entity.”); id. (“If the purchasing company has the
same owner as the selling company, the pre-pack is sometimes known as a ‘phoenix’
because it involves the same business being born again from its own ashes.”); Sally
Willcock, UK Pre-Pack Proposals Given the Thumbs Down, BANKRUPTCY BLOG (Aug. 1,
2011), http://business-finance-restructuring.weil.com/cross-border-update/uk-prepack-proposals-given-the-thumbs-down/#axzz1lSzPowIb (discussing pre-packaged
sales of businesses by English administrators to the business’ former owners).
250 Segal, supra note 28, at 967.
251 11 U.S.C. § 364(d)(1)(A)–(B) (2006).
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to “prime” a secured creditor does constitute an important functional
difference in the operation of security between the two systems.252
But the difference is incidental in the sense that, if the American system functions as intended, secured creditors would suffer no losses as
a result of the priming.
IV. FLOATING CHARGES COMPARED

WITH

ARTICLE 9 FLOATING LIENS

Abstract concepts play an important role in English legal reasoning. The theoretician imbues a concept with characteristics and then
the concept behaves in accord with them, sometimes seeming to
determine concrete outcomes. This has been especially so with floating charges. The following passage is, for example, a classic explanation of the floating charge:
A specific charge, I think, is one that without more fastens on ascertained and definite property or property capable of being ascertained and defined; a floating charge, on the other hand, is
ambulatory and shifting in its nature, hovering over and so to speak
floating with the property which it is intended to affect until some
event occurs or some act is done which causes it to settle and fasten
on the subject of the charge within its reach and grasp.253

From this explanation, one jurist concluded that “[i]t is inconsistent with the nature of a floating security that the holder should be
able to pounce down on particular assets and to interfere with the
company’s business while still keeping his security a floating security;
he cannot at once give freedom and insist on servitude.”254 Alternatively, the floating charge is sometimes described as “a licence or permission by the [creditor] to the [debtor] to deal with the
[collateral] . . . as though a [charge] had not been executed” until
that license is revoked by crystallization of the floating charge.255
These conceptualizations are sometimes said to lead to the concrete
conclusion that “third parties dealing with the [debtor] in the course
252 Segal, supra note 28, at 967 (“[T]here is no ability [in an English Administration proceeding] to prime and subordinate assets subject to a pre-[A]dministration
fixed charge.”).
253 In re Spectrum Plus Ltd., [2005] 2 A.C. 680, 718 (Lord Scott) (quoting
Illingworth v. Houldsworth, [1904] A.C. 355, 358 (Lord Macnaghten) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
254 Evans v. Rival Granite Quarries Ltd., [1910] 2 K.B. 979, 998, (Moulton, L.J).
255 In re Yorkshire Woolcombers Ass’n, Ltd., [1903] 2 Ch. 284, 298 (Cozens-Hardy,
L.J.); see also In re Spectrum Plus Ltd., [2005] 2 A.C. 680, 722 (Lord Scott) (stating
that until crystallization “the [debtor] is left free to use the charged asset and to
remove it from the security”).
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of their business [can] ignore [floating charges].”256 In keeping with
this conceptualization of the floating charge as conveying no rights in
the collateral until crystallization, Lord Scott said in Spectrum Plus, that
[t]here can . . . be no difference in categorisation between the grant
of a fixed charge expressed to come into existence on a future event
in relation to a specified class of assets owned by the [debtor] at that
time and the grant of a floating charge over the specified class of
assets with crystallisation taking place on the occurrence of that
event.257

Seemingly inconsistently, English judges and commentators also
maintain that a floating charge is “a present security, which presently
affects all the assets of the company expressed to be included in it.”258
“[T]he floating charge, though ambulatory, is a present security, not a
mere contract right, so that restrictions contained in it will constitute
an equity binding those who have notice of them.”259
Of course, no concrete outcomes flow from such legal conceptualizations except those that judges decide, in particular cases, to allow.
Legal doctrine and metaphor are almost infinitely malleable. As we
develop in this Part, sophisticated third parties dealing with the
debtor do not ignore floating charges, and those third parties who do
ignore them do so at their peril.
A comparison of the English floating charge with the American
floating lien in revolving assets illustrates the point. The American
floating lien is regarded as attached to each specific account or item
of inventory. The lien exists and is a “property,” or in English terminology a “proprietary,” interest in the collateral. Yet, even if the
American floating lien is fully perfected, the American grantor, like its
English counterpart, remains free to sell goods that are collateral in
the ordinary course of business.260 The American grantor, like its
English counterpart, is also free to modify or substitute accounts if the
256 Cretanor Mar. Co. v. Irish Marine Mgmt. Ltd, [1978] 3 All E.R. 164, 173 (Buckley, L.J). See, e.g., GULLIFER, LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 150, ¶ 5-38 (“[W]hilst the
[floating] charge is a present security it is non-specific and in principle does not affect
third parties at all while it continues to float.”).
257 In re Spectrum Plus Ltd., [2005] 2 A.C. 680, 720–21 (Lord Scott).
258 Evans v. Rival Granite Quarries Ltd., [1910] 2 K.B. 979, 999 (Buckley, L.J).
259 Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC v. Spectrum Plus Ltd., [2004] EWCA (Civ) 670,
[29] (Lord Phillips MR) (quoting ROY GOODE, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CREDIT AND SECURITY ¶ 5-40 (3d ed. 2003)), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/
2004/670.html.
260 U.C.C. § 9-320(a) (2012) (“[A] buyer in ordinary course of business . . . takes
free of a security interest created by the buyer’s seller, even if the security interest is
perfected and the buyer knows of its existence.”).
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underlying contracts have not yet been fully performed261 and to collect or compromise accounts if the underlying contracts have been
fully performed.262 The American floating lien neatly slips off each
item of collateral as the debtor disposes of inventory or substitutes or
collects accounts. It attaches to each new item of collateral as the
debtor acquires it. The English floating charge only hovers; the American floating lien lands and attaches. But the consequences are virtually the same.
In this Part, we seek to infer the true nature of the English floating charge by comparing those consequences with respect to buyers of
the collateral, competing security interests, execution creditors, insolvency administrators and other claimants in insolvency cases. We conclude that the English floating charge is sufficiently effective in those
competitions that it is the functional equivalent of an American floating lien.
A. Sale of Collateral
1. Original Collateral
As we noted in Part III., buyers of collateral generally take subject
to English fixed charges and American security interests. But buyers
of inventory in the ordinary course of business take free of both
English floating charges and American security interests, even if buyers know that the charges or interests exist.263 The American rule is
found in U.C.C. § 9-320(a), which provides that “a buyer in ordinary
course of business . . . takes free of a security interest created by the
buyer’s seller, even if the security interest is perfected and the buyer
knows of its existence.”264 The English rule is found in judicial interpretation. “It is in the nature of a floating charge that the company
retains, until crystallisation, the power to dispose of its assets in the
ordinary course of business free of the charge, and thus a purchaser
will take free of the charge . . . .”265
261 Id. § 9-405(a) (“A modification of or substitution for an assigned contract is
effective against an assignee if made in good faith.”).
262 Id. § 9-404(a)(1)–(2) (“[T]he rights of an assignee are subject to . . . all terms
of the agreement between the account debtor and assignor and . . . any other defense
or claim of the account debtor against the assignor which accrues before the account
debtor receives a notification of the assignment . . . .”).
263 See supra Part III.A. (explaining the treatment of a U.S. security interest upon
disposition of collateral).
264 U.C.C. § 9-320(a) (2012).
265 LAW COMMISSION, supra note19, ¶ 2.59, at 39–40.
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In neither system can a buyer take free if the buyer is aware that
its purchase violates the security agreement. American law defines
“buyer in ordinary course of business” to mean “a person that buys
goods in good faith, without knowledge that the sale violates the
rights of another person in the goods, and in the ordinary course
from a person . . . in the business of selling goods of that kind.”266
The English rule with respect to floating charges is that “a purchaser
will take free of the charge unless she has actual knowledge that it has
crystallised or that the disposition is not permitted because of some
explicit restriction in the charge.”267
As previously noted, the “buyer in ordinary course” concept is
narrower under American law than under English law. We doubt,
however, that debtors’ ability under English law to transfer capital
assets to ordinary course buyers free of floating charges makes any
significant difference in system function. That ability exists only with
respect to floating charges against capital assets,268 which is to say,
only in situations in which the secured creditor, by making the charge
floating, consents to the debtor selling the collateral free of the
charge.269 If the secured creditor consents to sale in the American
system, the result would be the same, even if the sale is not considered
to be in the ordinary course of business.270
Accounts receivable are another category of assets that debtors
may be more able to sell free of a security interest under English than
American law. Although American debtors have the right to collect,
compromise, and substitute accounts until the secured creditor notifies the account debtor to the contrary, American debtors have no
right to sell the accounts to third parties.271 English debtors arguably
do because “[i]t is in the nature of a floating charge that the company
retains, until crystallisation, the power to dispose of its assets in the
266 U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(9) (2012).
267 LAW COMMISSION, supra note 19, ¶ 2.59, at 40 (footnote omitted).
268 See supra Part III.A.1.
269 See the discussion of Ashborder, supra note 166 and accompanying text.
270 U.C.C. § 9-315(a)(1) (2012) (stating that “a security interest . . . continues in
collateral notwithstanding . . . disposition . . . unless the secured party authorized the
disposition free of the security interest”).
271 Absent agreement of the secured creditor, only buyers of goods and nonexclusive licenses take free of security interests under American law. Id. §§ 9-320(a), 9-321.
Some sales of accounts are excluded from Article 9 coverage. See id. § 9-109(d)(4)
(excluding sale of accounts as part of a sale of the business out of which they arose);
id. § 9-109(d)(5) (excluding sale of accounts for the purpose of collection only); id.
§ 9-109(d)(7) (excluding an assignment of a single account in satisfaction of a preexisting indebtedness). Exclusion from Article 9 coverage may or may not mean that no
security interests exist in such accounts.
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ordinary course of business free of the charge, and thus a purchaser
will take free of the charge . . . .”272 Thus, in theory, an English debtor
that granted a floating charge over its accounts could later sell or
grant a fixed charge in those accounts.
We doubt the practicality of that transaction. First, “transactions
which are intended to bring to an end, or have the effect of bringing
to an end, the company’s business are not transactions in the ordinary
course of its business.”273 Thus, if an English debtor sold its accounts
or inventory in bulk as part of a plan to terminate its business, the
transaction would be outside the ordinary course. The buyer would
take subject to the floating charge, just as the buyer would under
American law. Only the doctrinal explanation would be different.
Second, security agreements in both countries are likely to
restrict sales of accounts free of security interests. For example, the
sample Debenture (security agreement) in Goode, Commercial Law,
imposes these restrictions:
4.1 You must collect and realise all Receivables and immediately on
receipt pay all money which you receive in respect of them into your
bank account with us, or into any other account designated by
us . . . . You may not, without our prior written consent, charge,
factor, discount, assign, postpone, subordinate[,] or waive your
rights in respect of any Receivable in favour of any other person or
purport to do so. . . .
5 You must not, except with our prior written consent . . . 5.2 sell,
assign, lease, license or sub-license, or grant any interest in, your
Intellectual Property Rights, or purport to do so, or part with possession or ownership of them, or allow any third party access to them
or the right to use any copy of them.274

One who buys with actual knowledge of these restrictions, buys
subject to the charge—even if the sale is in the ordinary course. The
Law Commission states that
It is in the nature of a floating charge that the company retains,
until crystallisation, the power to dispose of its assets in the ordinary
course of business free of the charge, and thus a purchaser will take
free of the charge unless she has actual knowledge that it has crystallised or that the disposition is not permitted because of some
explicit restriction in the charge.275
272
273
L.J.).
274
275

LAW COMMISSION, supra note 19, ¶ 2.59, at 39–40.
Singh Sandhu v. Jet Star Retail Ltd., [2011] EWCA Civ 459, ¶ 10 (Moore-Bick

R

GOODE, supra note 34, at 636–37.
LAW COMMISSION, supra note 19 ¶ 2.59, at 39–40 (footnote omitted).
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Although the Law Commission’s view was that the doctrine of
constructive notice “does not apply to restrictions in the charge as
these are not registrable,” at least some commentators think otherwise.276 The gist of their argument is that restrictions against
extraordinary transactions are so common that buyers expect such
restrictions, and to avoid conflicts, search for them. Nolan maintains
that:
Even before a floating charge crystallises, the equitable interest created by it is capable of binding a third party who acquired property
within the scope of the charge other than in the ordinary course of
the company’s business, and with actual or constructive notice both of
the nature of the charge and of the circumstances of the transfer.277

Thus it is an exaggeration to say that until crystallization of a
floating charge, the debtor “is left free to use the charged asset and to
remove it from the security”278 or that “third parties dealing with the
[debtor] in the course of their business [can] ignore” floating
charges.279 Although the Law Commission recites that “a buyer of
goods in the ordinary course of business cannot be expected to search
against her seller in the Companies Register,”280 if the transaction is
more than a routine purchase of goods from inventory, the buyer
would be well-advised to do so.281 Once the buyer has conducted a
search, it will have actual knowledge of the restrictions, and so will be
bound by them. Thus, when the security agreement includes customary restrictions, the English rule’s application yields results virtually
indistinguishable from the results of the American rule’s application.

276 LAW COMMISSION, supra note 56 ¶ 3.219 n.274, at 83.
277 R.C. Nolan, Property in a Fund, 120 L.Q. REV. 108, 127 (2004) (emphasis
added). Ferran, on the other hand, “suggests that the relevant dicta in these cases are
unsound, but that the effect of a charge on a third party in the circumstances can be
justified on the grounds that the charge had crystallised.” Id. at 127 n.84 (citing Eilı́s
Ferran, Floating Charges—The Nature of the Security, 47 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 213, 231–33
(1988)). See, e.g., Hamilton v. Hunter [1982] 7 A.C.L.R. 295; Reynolds Bros. (Motors)
Party Ltd v. Esanda Ltd., [1983] 8 A.C.L.R. 422; 1 A.C.L.C. 1, 333.
278 In re Spectrum Plus Ltd., [2005] 2 A.C. 680,¶ 111 (Lord Scott L.J.).
279 Cretanor Mar. Co. v. Irish Marine Mgmt. Ltd, [1978] 3 All E.R. 164, 173 (Buckley, L.J.).
280 LAW COMMISSION, supra note 19, ¶ 2.60, at 40.
281 See LAW COMMISSION, supra note 56, ¶ 3.217, at 83 (“There is some doubt as to
when a purchaser who does not have actual knowledge of the charge will be put on
notice of it because it has been registered.”).
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2. Proceeds
An American floating lien attaches to “any identifiable proceeds
of [the] collateral.”282 Thus, if an American debtor sells inventory in
the ordinary course of business on credit, the floating lien does not
continue in the inventory, but does attach to the accounts receivable
thus created.
An English floating charge does not attach to the proceeds of
sale.283 Thus, Professor Goode states that “[a] floating charge covering assets of a particular description will not carry through to proceeds of a different description, for this would be inconsistent with
the power of disposition inherent in the floating charge.”284 As Professor Ferran points out, however, charge holders can opt out of the
default rule by drafting the security agreement to expressly cover
“receivables and their proceeds.”285 In practice, it is likely that most
professionally drafted security agreements will do so. We see no reason why the typical floating charge, which includes “all your undertaking, property, assets, rights[,] and revenues,” would not be adequate
to do so.286 Accordingly, there may not be a functional difference
between a U.S. security interest and an English floating charge with
respect to the ability to reach the proceeds of collateral sales.
B. Encumbrance of Collateral
1. Competing Secured Creditors
In a competition among American security interests, each has priority as of the date of registration or perfection, whichever occurs
first.287 Thus an American floating lien will have priority over any
later taker of a security interest in the same collateral.
Similarly, an English floating charge holder has priority over any
later taker of a floating charge.288 The order in which the floating
282 U.C.C. § 9-315(a)(2) (2012).
283 LAW COMMISSION, supra note 56, ¶ 3.52, at 45 (stating that in the event the
collateral is sold “if the charge were merely a floating charge . . . the court would infer
that the charge did not cover the proceeds”).
284 GOODE, supra note 34, at 659 n.142.
285 FERRAN, supra note 65 at 368.
286 GOODE, supra note 34, at 632.
287 U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(1) (2012) (“Conflicting perfected security interests . . . .
rank according to priority in time of filing or perfection.”).
288 In re Benjamin Cope & Sons Ltd., [1914] 1 Ch. 800, 807 (“[I]t would in my
view be as incompatible with the company’s bargain with the [floating charge holders] to put their debentures behind or on the same footing as subsequent debentures
giving a charge of the same character as if the debentures had constituted a specific
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charges crystallize does not matter.289 The recent case of Griffiths v.
Yorkshire Bank PLC.,290 held to the contrary—that a later created floating charge that crystallized before an earlier created floating charge
did take priority over the first charge. But commentators have uniformly disapproved Griffiths and we doubt the precedent will
survive.291
An English law floating charge holder does not, however, have
priority against subsequent fixed charge holders.292 The earlier floating charge “can be displaced by a [later created fixed charge].”293
Floating charge holders can attempt to achieve priority over subsequent fixed charge holders through the use of automatic crystallization and “negative pledge” clauses in their security agreements. We
previously discussed the use of automatic crystallization clauses.294 A
negative pledge prohibits the creation, without the consent of the
floating charge holder, of subsequent charges that would rank ahead
of the floating charge.295
A subsequent fixed charge holder may take subject to an automatically crystallized floating charge even if it lacks actual notice of
charge and it were then attempted to create a subsequent specific charge ranking pari
passu with them or in priority to them.”); see also In re Household Products Co.,
[1981] 124 D.L.R. 3d 325 (holding that a later charged debenture is subordinate to
earlier floating charge debenture).
289 GOODE, supra note 34, at 733 (“By contrast, the grant of a subsequent floating
charge ranking in priority to the first floating charge is prima facie against the intention of the earlier charge and, even if the later charge is the first to crystallize, it is
ineffective vis-à-vis the holder of the earlier charge except in so far as thereby
authorized.”).
290 [1994] 1 W.L.R. 1427.
291 See FERRAN, supra note 65, at 388 (“Although there is one case [Griffiths] that
suggests otherwise, the better view is that crystallization does not affect the priority of
a floating charge against other interests in the same property which pre[-]date crystallization.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 393 n.281 (“Griffiths, which is to the effect that a
second floating charge can take priority by being the first to crystalize, is inconsistent
with earlier authorities.” (citation omitted)); GOODE, supra note 34, at 733 n.79 (stating that two earlier cases “were, unfortunately, not drawn to the attention of Morritt J
in Griffiths”).
292 LAW COMMISSION, supra note 56, ¶ 3.177, at 73 (“Under current law, the general rule is that a floating charge will lose priority to a subsequent fixed charge.”).
293 In re Benjamin Cope & Sons, [1914] 1 Ch. at 806; see also In re Ind, Coope & Co.,
[1911] 2 Ch. 223 at 234 (holding that “[t]he effect of . . . the debenture[ ] . . . being a
floating security only, was to reserve . . . a power to the [debtor] to give a security on a
particular asset in priority to the debenture[ ]”); Wheatley v. Silkstone & Haigh Moor
Coal Co., [1885] 29 Ch. 715 at 724 (holding that a later created mortgage was “not
subject to [a] claim created by [a preexisting floating charge]”).
294 See supra Part II.C.
295 See GOUGH, supra note 184, at 225.
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crystallization. Thus, in the Brightlife case, “the effect of the validity
of . . . automatic crystallization . . . was such that it did in a quite
profound way affect the other third party creditors of the company,
notwithstanding the fact that they may not have known (although the
company did) that the floating charge had crystallised.”296
A subsequent fixed charge holder’s actual notice of a floating
charge that incorporates a negative pledge clause prohibiting or
restricting the grant of additional higher-ranking security is sufficient
to give the floating charge holder priority over the subsequent fixed
charge.297 Constructive notice is not sufficient,298 but actual notice
can be imputed if the fixed charge holder has been “willfully” negligent to an extent that “amounts to evidence of fraud.”299 Merely failing to make an “investigation or inquiry” does not amount to the
willful negligence required for notice to be imputed.300
These rules suggest that the courts would usually find creditors
taking subsequent fixed charges to have priority over earlier floating
charges. But “usually” is not enough to make the taking of subsequent fixed charges commercially feasible. The Law Commission
stated:
We understand that in practice a subsequent creditor will not take
the risk that there may be a negative pledge or automatic crystallisa296 Andrew Wilkinson, Automatic Crystallisation of Floating Charges, 8 COMPANY LAW
75, 77 (1987); see also Charles Mayo & Eilis Ferran, Registration of Company Charges—
The New Regime, J.B.L. Mar. 1991, 152, 165–66 (explaining that one argument against
automatic crystallization is that it is “unfair to other persons dealing with the company
who are unable to discover the true position” and thus, without notice, may take subject to a crystallized floating charge).
297 In re Spectrum Plus Ltd., [2004] Ch. 337 at 365–66 (Lord Phillips MR) (citing
Professor Goode and endorsing the proposition that “[i]f [a floating charge] imposes
restrictions on sales or subsequent encumbrances and the particular sale or charge,
though in the ordinary course of business is in breach of such restrictions, the floating
charge will, on crystallisation, retain its priority if the buyer or encumbrancer took
with notice of the restrictions, whether his interest is legal or equitable”). But see
Siebe Gorman & Co. v. Barclays Bank Ltd., [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 142 (Ch.D.) 157
(holding that a negative pledge clause would not operate to subordinate a later created fixed charge as “neither Siebe Gorman nor its solicitors had any actual knowledge of any of the [relevant provisions] of the debenture”).
298 See Wilson v. Kelland, [1910] 2 Ch. 306 at 306 (stating that registered particulars “would have amounted to constructive notice of a charge affecting the property
but not of any special restrictions upon dealings by the company with its property in
the usual manner when the subsisting charge is a floating security”).
299 English & Scottish Mercantile Inv. Trust Ltd. v. Brunton, [1892] 2 Q.B. 1 at 10.
300 Wilson, [1910] 2 Ch. at 306 (holding that a fixed charge holder’s failure to
make an “investigation or inquiry” into whether a negative pledge clause existed did
not subordinate the fixed charge to a preexisting floating charge).
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tion clause and that it might be found to have had notice of it. If it
wants to ensure its priority it will make a subordination agreement
with the floating charge-holder.301

Thus, as a practical matter, an English floating charge is sufficient
to deter the taking of subsequent fixed charges that might have priority. Here again, the differences in legal doctrine between the English
and American systems largely disappear in actual practice.
2. Lien Creditors
As previously discussed,302 English fixed charges and American
security interests have priority over execution liens with later priority
dates. Before lending, secured creditors generally discover and clear
execution liens with earlier priority dates. As a result, English fixed
charges and American security interests almost invariably have priority
over execution liens.
On its face, the English system appears to operate differently with
respect to floating charges. Even after registration, English law gives
floating charges no priority over subsequent lien creditors so long as
the charges float.303 As the Law Commission put it, “[i]n principle an
execution creditor takes free of a floating charge if it has completed
execution before crystallisation of the charge.”304 The English rules
led Professor Picker to conclude that English judgment creditors
could obtain priority over floating charge holders through execution
and that, as a result, there was a functional difference between the
English and American systems:
The Article 9 security interest in inventory is good against the lien
creditor, both genuine lien creditors under Revised section 9317(a) and hypothetical lien creditors under section 544 of the
Bankruptcy Code. The uncrystallized floating charge is not good
against a lien creditor nor is it spared from the invasion of claims
given a statutory preference in a liquidation. The structure of this
system means that a group of assets—those that can be subject to no
more than a floating charge—are always up for grabs.305
301 LAW COMMISSION, supra note 56, ¶ 3.179, at 74.
302 See supra Part III.B.2.
303 See LAW COMMISSION, supra note 19, ¶ 2.41, at 34 (“Further an uncrystallised
floating charge has no priority against execution creditors, landlord’s distress, set-offs
and possessory liens.”).
304 LAW COMMISSION, supra note 56, ¶ 3.201, at 79.
305 Randal C. Picker, Perfection Hierarchies and Nontemporal Priority Rules, 74 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1157, 1185 (1999) (footnote omitted).
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The Law Commission takes a different view. They start with the
observation that the judgment creditor must “complete” its execution
before crystallization to have priority over the floating charge.306
Goode concurs.307 The English authorities are vague as to when an
execution is complete.308 Completion seems to be a reference to the
Insolvency Act, which states that “[f]or purposes of this Act . . . an
execution against goods is completed by seizure and sale . . . .”309 An
execution against goods may not be complete until the collateral is
sold,310 or even until the proceeds of sale are distributed.311
As a practical matter, floating charge holders can crystallize their
charges before judgment creditors can complete their executions.
They can do so in two ways. The first is through automatic
crystallization:
In practice the attempted execution is likely to trigger an automatic
crystallisation clause in the floating charge. An automatic crystallisation clause is likely to be effective in this type of case, since the
rights of the execution creditor do not depend on whether it had
notice of the clause or of the crystallising event. Thus if there is
such a clause the execution creditor will be unable to claim any of
the debtor’s property.312
306 See LAW COMMISSION, supra note 56, ¶ 3.201, at 79.
307 See GOODE, supra note 34, at 733 (“Since no specific asset is affected by the
floating charge until crystallization, it follows that an execution creditor who completes his execution before crystallization gets priority.” (footnote omitted)).
308 See, e.g., Supreme Court Act, 1981, c. 54, § 138 (“(1) Subject to subsection (2),
a writ of fieri facias or other writ of execution against goods issued from the High
Court shall bind the property in the goods of the execution debtor as from the time
when the writ is delivered to the sheriff to be executed.”); Bankers Trust Co. v.
Galadari, [1987] Q.B. 222 at 224 (“It should be noted that the property in the goods
is bound from the time of delivery of the writ and not from the time when the sheriff
obtains possession under the writ.”).
309 Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 183(3). Goode follows this trail. See GOODE,
supra note 34, at 733 n.79 (offering cross reference from crystallization to the Insolvency Act definition).
310 See In re Opera, Ltd., [1891] 3 Ch. 260 (Lord Lindley).
[T]he rights of the [floating charge holder] must prevail even as against the
execution creditor, at least before sale. What the position of the [floating
charge holder] is after the property is sold and the money handed over, I do
not know, and I will not say at this moment . . . .
Id. at 263. For further discussion on the academic literature and the scarce case law
authority on this point, see GULLIFER, LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 150, ¶ 5-44, at 201.
311 See Robinson v. Burnell’s Vienna Bakery Co., [1904] 2 K.B. 624 (holding that a
creditor with a crystallized floating charge could not pursue money received by an
execution creditor after seizure and sale of the collateral).
312 LAW COMMISSION, supra note 56, ¶ 3.201, at 79.
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The second is by discovering the execution in progress and giving
notice of crystallization before the execution is complete. Discovery is
not difficult because execution sale is a public event.313 Because the
floating charge holders can act more quickly than the execution creditors, no assets are “up for grabs” in any meaningful sense.
The competition between floating charges and garnishment
works in essentially the same way. The garnishing creditor is entitled
to keep any money received prior to crystallization, but loses any
money not received prior to crystallization.314 The floating charge
holder can prevail through the use of the same two strategies.
To employ these strategies, the secured creditor must crystallize
the charge with respect to all of the charged assets.315 That may force
the debtor to close its business or to file an insolvency proceeding.
Thus, crystallization strategies are not costless for the secured creditor. But secured creditors are likely to prefer an insolvency proceeding when their debtor is unable to resolve an execution.
Crystallization followed by de-crystallization after the collateral has
been released from the execution is another possible strategy.316
In summary, floating charge holders can, through legal strategies,
gain the very priorities over buyers, competing charge holders, and
execution creditors that legal doctrine denies to them. As a result, in
the absence of insolvency proceedings, the English floating charge
functions in essentially the same manner as the American floating
lien. Both allow the debtor to sell inventory free of the security interest in the ordinary course of business without the secured creditor’s
consent. Both, as a practical matter, make it difficult or impossible for
313 See, e.g., Cuckmere Brick Co. v. Mut. Fin. Ltd., [1971] Ch. 949 at 950 (holding
that duty of care to “obtain a proper price” in exercising his power of sale was violated
where mortgagee failed to properly advertise collateral to be sold at public auction);
Standard Chartered Bank Ltd. v. Walker, [1982] 1 W.L.R. 1410 (holding that it was a
triable issue of fact whether receiver had violated duty of care and been negligent in
preparing and conducting public auction sale at short notice and with minimum
publicity).
314 See, e.g., Cairney v. Back, [1906] 2 K.B. 746 (holding that a garnishment order
did not transfer the accounts receivable to the lien creditor as property and that the
holder of the crystallized floating charge was entitled to the proceeds of the accounts
receivable in priority to the lien creditor); Robson v. Smith, [1895] 2 Ch. 118 at 126
(holding that a lien creditor is entitled to garnishment proceeds if a floating charge is
uncrystallized).
315 Evans v. Rival Granite Quarries, Ltd., [1910] 2 K.B. 979, 982 (Lord Williams
L.J.) (“The debenture-holder cannot pick out one particular asset of the company
and make his charge attach to that asset, while allowing the company to go on carrying on business and the charge to remain a floating charge as concerns other
assets . . . .”).
316 See supra Part II.C.
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other buyers, competing secured creditors, or lienholders to gain priority over the floating charge or floating lien once they have been
perfected through registration.
C. Rights in Insolvency Proceedings
In Part III.C., we argued that the treatment of English fixed
charges in insolvency proceedings is highly similar to the treatment of
American security interests in insolvency proceedings. The differences—cramdown and priming—are unlikely to reduce secured creditors’ recoveries.
In this section, we compare the treatment of English floating
charges in insolvency proceedings to the treatment of American security interests in insolvency proceedings. Because we have already compared fixed charges with American security interests, we limit this
discussion to aspects of floating charges that differ from fixed charges.
1. Initiation
In Part III.C.1., we noted that, although fixed charge holders
have greater rights to directly initiate insolvency proceedings than do
American secured creditors, the difference is unimportant. American
secured creditors can easily initiate insolvency proceedings indirectly
by proceeding against their collateral.
The holders of floating charges have even greater rights in the
initiation of insolvency proceedings than do the holders of fixed
charges.317 The holder of a fixed charge must have court approval to
initiate;318 the holder of a qualifying floating charge does not need
court approval. Unlike the holder of a fixed charge, the holder of a
floating charge who initiates an Administration can choose the insol317 See Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, sch. B1 ¶ 14 (“Power to appoint[:] (1) The holder
of a qualifying floating charge . . . may appoint an administrator of the company.
(2) . . . [A] floating charge qualifies if created by an instrument which—(a) states that
this paragraph applies to the floating charge, [or] (b) purports to empower the
holder of the floating charge to appoint an administrator of the company. . . . (3) . . .
[A] person is the holder of a qualifying floating charge . . . if he holds one or more
debentures of the company secured—(a) by a qualifying floating charge which relates
to the whole or substantially the whole of the company’s property . . . .”).
318 See id. ¶ 12(1) (“An application to the court for an administration order in
respect of a company . . . may be made only by . . . one or more creditors of the
company . . . .”); id. ¶13(1) (“On hearing an administration application the court
may . . . . . make the administration order sought; . . . dismiss the application; . . .
make any other order which the court thinks appropriate.”).
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vency practitioner who will serve as administrator.319 Unlike a fixed
charge holder, a floating charge holder can apply to remove a debtor
company from compulsory Winding-up into Administration.320
Together, these rights confer on floating charge holders considerable
control over their insolvent debtors. They may partly explain the British banker saying reported by Westbrook: “The fixed charge for priority; the floating charge for control.”321 As previously noted, however,
the additional control does not easily translate into a higher recovery,
because the administrator chosen is required to conduct the case in
the interests of all parties, not the floating charge holder’s interests.322
2. Administrative Expenses
Administrative expenses are the expenses of the insolvency process. In both the English and American systems, they include the
expenses of operating the business during the insolvency case and the
fees and out-of-pocket expenses of some of the professionals who work
during the insolvency case.
For purposes of this analysis, they do not include the expenses of
preserving and disposing of collateral. As stated by Lord Millett in
Buchler v. Talbot:
The costs of realising a particular property, however, must be distinguished from the general expenses of the winding up or receivership. The costs of realisation are deductible from the proceeds of
the property realised, whether it is realised by the liquidator or the
319 Id. ¶ 36 (requiring that the court grant the application of a floating charge
holder “to have a specified person appointed as administrator . . . unless the court
thinks it right to refuse the application because of the particular circumstances of the
case”).
320 The Insolvency Act of 1986 further provides:
(1) This paragraph applies where the holder of a qualifying floating
charge . . . . . could appoint an administrator under paragraph 14 but for
paragraph 8(1)(b) [because a winding-up order has been made in respect of
the company].
(2) The holder of the qualifying floating charge may make an administration application.
(3) If the court makes an administration order . . . the court shall discharge
the winding-up order . . . .
Id. ¶ 37.
321 Westbrook, supra note 24, at 795; see also Buchler v. Talbot, [2004] 1 All E.R.
1289 (H.L.) at 1293 (Lord Nicholls) (“Typically a floating charge extends to substantially all the assets of a company. On its face this gives a charge holder a high degree
of control over the assets and fortunes of a company.”).
322 See supra note 224 and accompanying text.

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-4\NDL402.txt

unknown

Seq: 69

9-MAY-13

2013] o p t i m i z i n g e n g l i s h a n d a m e r i c a n s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s

14:32

1853

receiver, for it is only the net proceeds of the property which are
comprised in the winding up or receivership as the case may be.323

Expenses of preserving and disposing of collateral were discussed
in Part III.C., above.
In the American system, secured debts have priority over administrative expenses.324 In the English system, fixed charges have priority
over administrative expenses,325 but floating charges are subordinate
to administrative expenses. The latter is true even if the floating
charge crystallized prior to insolvency.326 These priorities are, by statute, applicable in both Administration327 and Winding-up.328
The subordination of floating charges to administrative expenses
causes the English system to operate differently from the American
system. Neither system provides significant public funding for the
administration of particular estates. In either country, a company
with no unencumbered assets with which to pay insolvency professionals may be unable to reorganize or liquidate in insolvency proceedings.329 A common strategy is to deplete or fully encumber a
company’s assets before placing the company in bankruptcy, leaving
no assets available to pay administrative expenses.330 The insolvency
323 Buchler v. Talbot, 1 All E.R. at 1304-05 (Lord Millett).
324 See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
325 See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
326 See Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 251(b) (“ ‘[F]loating charge’ means a charge
which, as created, was a floating charge . . . .”).
327 Schedule B1 ¶ 99(3) provides:
The former administrator’s remuneration and expenses shall be—
(a) charged on and payable out of property of which he had custody or
control immediately before cessation, and
(b) payable in priority to any security to which paragraph 70 applies.
Id. sch. B1 ¶ 99(3). Paragraph 70 applies to floating charges. Id. ¶ 70.
328 Section 176ZA provides:
The expenses of winding up in England and Wales, so far as the assets of the
company available for payment of general creditors are insufficient to meet
them, have priority over any claims to property comprised in or subject to
any floating charge created by the company and shall be paid out of any
such property accordingly.
Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 176ZA.
329 E.g., In re Jer/Jameson Mezz Borrower II, LLC, 461 B.R. 293, 306 (Bankr. D.
Del. 2011) (“[T]he Debtors’ budget proves that any net operating income that is
being realized is insufficient to cover the costs of this case. Allowing such a case to
remain in chapter 11 when it is administratively insolvent is not appropriate.”).
330 INT’L ASS’N OF INSOLVENCY REGULATORS, supra note 248, at 7 (“In some insolvency situations, unscrupulous directors may deliberately deplete a company’s assets,
so as to result in insufficient assets being left to justify the appointment by a creditor
of an insolvency practitioner to the insolvent company.”).
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case will be dismissed and the company liquidated through less-effective procedures. The resulting losses may be substantial.
Most businesses have revolving assets. Under Spectrum, those
assets cannot be encumbered by fixed charges. In most cases, those
unencumbered assets assure the availability of at least some funding
for the continued operation of a viable business, the orderly liquidation of a non-viable one, the bringing of necessary litigation on behalf
of the estate,331 and the general functioning of the insolvency process.332 That increases the likelihood that the insolvency system can
function as intended.
The American rule does not assure the availability of funds to pay
administrative expenses. Most debtors in need of insolvency proceedings have already fully encumbered their assets.333 Because they have
no funds with which to pay administrative expenses, many are unable
to file and are liquidated.334 Others find a work-around. The owners
of the business may fund the insolvency proceeding, either because
they personally guaranteed debts or because they seek to buy the business back from the bankruptcy court at a discount.335 Secured creditors may agree to “carve-out” some portion of the collateral to fund a
331 With the approval of the court, floating charge collateral can be used to pay
the expenses of litigation brought by the estate. See Insolvency Rules, 1986, S.I. 1986/
1925, ¶¶ 4.218A–4.218E.
332 Segal, supra note 28, at 936 (“The combination of this provision of the Enterprise Act and the In re Spectrum decision means that in many cases, administrators will
now have access to funds to cover the costs of the administration without the need to
obtain the consent of the secured creditor.”).
333 See Claire A. Hill, Is Secured Debt Efficient?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1117, 1176 (2002)
(“Among lower-quality firms, the use of secured credit is virtually ubiquitous. Almost
all the firms secure all their assets, giving ‘blanket liens’ to a lender. The divergence
of interest between lenders and firms is sufficiently high that lenders need the level of
constraints blanket liens provide.”). Hill’s definition of “lower-quality firms” is firms
with bond ratings lower than BBB+. Id. at 1136. Thus, she probably looked principally at the largest 10% of firms in the relevant population. See Elizabeth Warren &
Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Financial Characteristics of Businesses in Bankruptcy, 73 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 499, 543 (1999) (stating 91% of Chapter 11 bankruptcies involve cases
with assets less than $5 million).
334 For example, Westbrook states:
The existence of the cases where the secured party agreed to carve-out necessarily implies other cases—one would think a substantial majority of those
involving a dominant secured party—in which the secured party would have
no interest in a bankruptcy proceeding, would refuse a carve-out, and would
therefore leave the proceeding unfinanced and unsustainable.
Westbrook, supra note 24, at 817 n.72.
335 See Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S.
434, 458 (1999) (requiring that such buy-backs be subjected to some kind of market
test); see generally LYNN M. LOPUCKI & CHRISTOPHER R. MIRICK, STRATEGIES FOR CREDI-
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reorganization or liquidation that has been scripted to the secured
creditors’ requirements.336 If funds are unavailable to pay bankruptcy
professionals to investigate the debtor’s financial affairs, the obligation to conduct such an investigation routinely goes unfulfilled.337
Thus, in the common situation in which the debtor’s assets are fully
encumbered, the American insolvency system is subject to
manipulation.
3. Preferential unsecured debts
In both the English and American systems, some unsecured debts
that do not have priority in the absence of insolvency proceedings are
given priority in their presence. In the English system, these debts are
principally obligations owing to, or payable on behalf of, employees
for back pay, benefits, or pension contributions. They are referred to
as “preferential unsecured debts.”338 In the American system these
debts cover a broader range, include some debts owing to or on
behalf of employees for pay or benefits, and are referred to as “bankruptcy priority claims.”339
TORS IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS § 11.11[B] (5th ed. 2007) (describing the techniques debtors employ and creditors’ responsive strategies).
336 E.g., In re Debbie Reynolds Resorts, Inc., 255 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2001)
(“In effect, RFI attempted to buy ‘closure’ by agreeing to a $50,000 surcharge in
exchange for assurance that there would be no further challenges to collection of its
secured debt.”); In re Ocean Power Corp., 2007 WL 949598, at *4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2007) (finding carve-out conditioned on sale of the debtor’s property to the secured
creditor).
337 On the English side, Armour notes that “[l]iquidators frequently investigate
fraudulent conduct by company directors, and if floating charge assets are not available to them, they may not be able to do so.” John Armour, Should We Redistribute in
Insolvency?, in COMPANY CHARGES: SPECTRUM AND BEYOND, supra note 15 at 189, 222.
On the American side, LoPucki explains:
The job of discovering, investigating, and litigating over dishonesty by a
Chapter 7 debtor is delegated to the trustee. The trustee is paid for these
tasks from the debtor’s estate. If there is no money in the estate, the trustee
is paid $60 of the filing fee paid by the debtor to commence the case. The
$60 is paid on the trustee’s representation that the trustee has performed
whatever of these services were necessary in the particular case; the trustee
earns no more by discovering dishonesty and litigating over the discharge.
Hence, in a no-asset case, the trustee has a strong economic disincentive to
discover fraud of a nature that requires objection to discharge.
Lynn M. LoPucki, Common Sense Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 461, 467
(1997) (footnotes omitted).
338 See Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 386, sch. 6.
339 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (2006).
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In the American system, bankruptcy priority claims are
subordinate to secured claims.340 In the English system, preferential
unsecured debts are subordinate to fixed charges, but have priority
over floating charges in both administration341 and liquidation.342
The probable result is that preferential unsecured debts are more
often paid in English than in American insolvencies.
4. General Unsecured Creditor Carve-outs
As previously noted, English law creates an insolvency carve-out
from floating charge collateral in favor of general unsecured creditors. To the extent of the “prescribed part,” general unsecured creditors rank ahead of floating charge holders. The Prescribed Part
Order specifies that extent:
(1) The prescribed part of the company’s net property to be made
available for the satisfaction of unsecured debts of the company . . .
shall be calculated as follows —
(a) where the company’s net property does not exceed
£10,000 in value, 50% of that property;343
(b) subject to paragraph (2), where the company’s net
property exceeds £10,000 in value the sum of—
(i) 50% of the first £10,000 in value; and
(ii) 20% of that part of the company’s net property
which exceeds £10,000 in value.
(2) The value of the prescribed part of the company’s net property
to be made available for the satisfaction of unsecured debts of the
340 See supra note 233.
341 The Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, sch. B1 ¶ 65(1) (in Administration), provides
that “[t]he administrator . . . may make a distribution to a creditor of the company”
and that “Section 175 shall apply in relation to a distribution under this paragraph as
it applies in relation to a winding up.” Id. ¶ 65(2). Section 175 gives preferential
debts priority over floating charges in winding up.
342 The Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 175(2)(b) (in Winding-Up). (2) Preferential
debts . . . (b) so far as the assets of the company available for payment of general
creditors are insufficient to meet them, have priority over the claims of holders of
debentures secured by, or holders of, any floating charge created by the company,
and shall be paid accordingly out of any property comprised in or subject to that
charge.
343 The Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 176A(3)(a), subject to the discretion of the
administrator, requires a minimum amount of value before applying the prescribed
part calculation. The Insolvency Act, 1986, (Prescribed Part) Order 2003 ¶ 2, defines
“the minimum value of the company’s net property” as “£10,000.” The interaction
between these provisions seems to leave the administrator with broad power to control the amount, if any, payable under this subparagraph.
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company pursuant to [the statutory provision] shall not exceed
£600,000.344

As of this writing, the exchange rate is that £1 is equal to $1.57.
The Insolvency Act requires that in both administration and liquidation the prescribed part be paid to unsecured creditors before any
distributions are made to floating charge holders.345
Carve-outs from secured creditors’ collateral in favor of
unsecured creditors exist under the laws of many other countries.346
The United States is not, however, among them. Professor Elizabeth
Warren proposed a carve-out for the United States that would have

344 Insolvency Act, 1986, (Prescribed Part) Order 2003 ¶ 3.
345 Insolvency Act, § 176A provides that:
(2) The liquidator, administrator or receiver—
(a) shall make a prescribed part of the company’s net property available for the satisfaction of unsecured[ ] debts, and
(b) shall not distribute that part to the proprietor of a floating charge
except in so far as it exceeds the amount[ ]required for the satisfaction
of unsecured debts.
Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 176A(2)(a)–(b). .
346 See, e.g., CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.], arts. L. 143-10, L. 143-11, L. 742-6, L. 75115 (Fr.) (granting, by French labor code, of absolute superpriority to employees’
claims for wages covering the last 60 days’ wages prior to opening of insolvency proceedings); CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.], art. 622-17 (providing in the French commercial code for priority of administrative expenses, employees’ claims for wages and
approved post-petition funding over secured and unsecured pre-petition claims in
procédure de sauvegarde, the French equivalent of U.S. Chapter 11 and English Administration proceedings); INSOLVENZORDNUNG [Insolvency Statute], Oct. 5, 1994, BGBL. I
at 2866, §§ 170, 171 (Ger.) (imposing on secured creditors, by German statute, a
cumulative 9% surcharge against collateral to permit the estate to recoup the costs of
determination and disposition of collateral in insolvency proceedings plus turnover
tax at the rate of 19%, for a total possible cost to the secured creditor of 28%); Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, §§ 81.1–2 (providing, in Canadian statute, for priority over secured creditors of claims by unpaid suppliers, farmers,
fishermen and aquaculturists under defined circumstances); id. at § 81.3 (1) (providing employees with “security on the bankrupt’s current assets on the date of bankruptcy for six months of prepetition wages up to $2,000); id. at § 81.3 (4) (stating that
“a security under this section ranks above every other . . . charge or security against
the bankrupt’s current assets — regardless of when that other . . . charge or security
arose”); id. at 81.5 (1), (2) (providing same with respect to certain pension contributions required but not made); Ley de Concursos Mercantiles [LCM] [Bankruptcy
Law], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 12 de Mayo de 2000, art. 217 (Mex.),
translated in INTERNATIONAL STATEMENT OF MEXICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW 261-64 (A.L.I.
2003) (providing, in Mexican law, for the payment of “creditors having a security
interest”); id. at 224, 225 (providing for the payment of certain wages and administrative expenses “prior to any debts referred to in Article 217”).
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applied in or out of insolvency proceedings.347 Not a single member
of the Uniform Commercial Code drafting committee thought it
should even be considered.348 A few American bankruptcy courts
have imposed such a carve-out informally, as a condition of bankruptcy relief in cases the filing of which might not otherwise have
been appropriate.349 As one such court noted:
“Historically, bankruptcy courts do not view themselves as an alternative to a state court foreclosure process. That is to say if the DIP
or Trustee is proposing a sale where the only parties to benefit are
the secured creditors and the professionals, the court will generally
disapprove the sale. To that end, sellers should propose a ‘carve
out’ for priority or unsecured creditors. This carve out can range
from 1% to over 20% . . . [.] One can also reasonably anticipate
that in sales where there are significant issues about employee
retention, courts may be sympathetic to a reduction in the proposed
carve out.”350

Such imposition is, however, rare. Generally speaking, the American system is one in which the priority of secured creditors over
unsecured creditors remains absolute.
CONCLUSION
English charges are often portrayed as fundamentally different
from American security interests.351 But, as we have shown in this
347 See Memorandum from Elizabeth Warren, Council Member, Am. Law Inst., to
the Council of the Am. Law Inst., Article 9 Set Aside for Unsecured Creditors (Apr.
25, 1996), reprinted in LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 12, at 679–81.
348 See LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 12, at 682 (quoting Professor Charles
Mooney as saying that the Warren carve out proposal “died for lack of a first” in the
drafting committee).
349 E.g., Order Authorizing the Sale of Assets of the Debtor Free and Clear of
Liens, Claims, Encumbrances, and Other Interests and Memorandum in Support at 3,
In re Pulliam Motor Co., No. 07-01555-dd (Bankr. D.S.C. Apr. 17, 2007) (“From the
proceeds of the Sale, the Debtor will create a carveout for distribution to the
unsecured creditors of the estate in an amount not less than $300,000 (the
‘Carveout’), which the Debtor estimates is approximately 20% of the known
unsecured claims.”).
350 In re Merit Grp., Inc., 464 B.R. 240, 251 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2011) (citations omitted) (quoting In re StarTrans Inc., Case No. 09–07468 (Bankr. D.S.C. Nov. 5, 2009)).
351 See Jeanette L. Goldsberry, Perfection of Nonpossessory Security Interests Under
Revised Article 9: Consequences of the Practical and Conceptual Incompatibility of US and
English Secured Transactions Law, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 241, 244 (2002) (referring to uncrystallized floating charges as “an ‘intermediate state of perfected but non-specific or
floating’ prior to crystallization of the floating charge, which is not accommodated
within the Article 9 notice filing system” (citation omitted)); id. at 243–44 (“The floating charge is much broader [than the Article 9 floating lien], potentially covering ‘all
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Article, the two function in essentially the same way. In both countries, creditors generally require that their debtors grant security interests in all of the assets of their businesses. If the English security
interest is in revolving assets—inventory, accounts receivable, and
bank deposits—it can, as a practical matter, be only a floating charge.
If it is in other assets, it can be both a floating charge and a fixed
charge. Typically, the result is that the English secured creditor has a
floating charge on the revolving assets and a fixed charges on the capital assets.352 Together, the charges combine to cause all of the assets
to secure all of the debt.
Following any necessary registration, American security interests
and English fixed charges have priority in existing and after-acquired
collateral. Their priority is over later-created security interests, the
liens of judgment creditors, and the rights of unsecured creditors.
In theory, English floating charges do not have priority over latercreated security interests or lien creditors who obtain interests before
the floating charges crystallize. But in practice, creditors employ the
English floating charge in combination with negative pledges and
automatic crystallization provisions to achieve a de facto priority. As a
result, even before crystallization, the floating charge effectively
reserves priority over the later lenders and purchasers. In 2005, the
Law Commission recommended this de facto priority be converted to
full, formal priority.353 Adoption would eliminate this often-asserted
difference between English and American security interests.
In both countries, debtors can sell inventory in the ordinary
course of business, free of security interests. Absent insolvency proceedings, in neither country can the debtor sell capital assets without
the secured creditor’s consent.
the property of the debtor, in all countries of the world.’ ” (citation omitted)); Brian
M. McCall, Money, Money Everywhere but Not a Drop to Secure: A Proposal for Amending the
Perfection Rules for Security Interests in Money and Deposit Accounts, 74 TENN. L. REV. 669,
705 (2007) (“Unlike Article 9, though, English law allows a secured party to take a
floating charge over the revolving pool of money and deposit accounts held by a
debtor without having to take possession or control of them.”).
352 GOODE, supra note 34, at 630 (“Typically, a debenture will contain both a fixed
and a floating charge, the former covering fixed assets and debts, the latter covering
the remaining types of asset . . . .”); Segal, supra note 28, at 937 (“Banks and other
secured lenders in England will frequently be granted an all assets debenture containing both a fixed and a floating charge.”); Westbrook, supra note 24, at 819 (“The
creditor who holds the floating charge in this system almost always has a ‘fixed’
charge as well, often over most, if not all, of the debtor’s assets.”).
353 LAW COMMISSION, supra note 56, ¶ 3.179; id. ¶ 3.180 (“We recommend that the
priority of a charge against another charge or a pledge should depend on the date of
registration of the financing statement whether the charge is fixed or floating.”).
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Under current law in both countries, the filing of an insolvency
proceeding stays enforcement of security interests. In both countries,
the court has broad discretion to decide when the secured creditor
can proceed with enforcement. In both countries, the security interest remains effective during the bankruptcy case and retains its priority, with three exceptions.
First, in the American system, the court can permit a new lender
to prime prepetition secured creditors. An English court has no corresponding power. But the American adequate protection requirement limits the practical importance of this difference.
Second, in the American system, the court can cram down, over
the objection of the secured creditor, a reorganization plan that pays
less than the full amount owing to the secured creditor. In the
English system the court can accomplish the same thing, but only
somewhat awkwardly, by approving a sale of the collateral for less than
the amount of the secured debt.
Third, the English system has a carve-out in favor of unsecured
creditors. The American system does not. The English Carve-out is a
statutory subordination of floating charges to expenses of administration, preferential creditors, and the unsecured creditors’ prescribed
share.
Both England and the United States award priority in order of
time. Both use security interest registration systems to alert those who
later deal with a debtor to the security interests and liens in favor of
those who earlier dealt with the debtor. Neither set of registration
systems employ state of the art technology. Both make exceptions to
the registration requirement that result in secret liens.
There are, however, important differences in those registration
systems. First, the registration exceptions are not, as one would
expect, with respect to the same kinds of collateral. Second, English
law creates an “invisibility period” of up to twenty-one days during
which a charge has priority but cannot be discovered through a
search. The American system generally gives effect to filings only
when made, and so does not create such an invisibility period.354
Third, the English view their system as serving the public. The Americans view their system as serving only debtors and secured creditors.
As a result, the English make more information available to a wider
range of users than do the Americans.
Our claim is that the differences we have identified between the
English and American systems represent a range of policy choices
354 But see U.C.C. § 9-324(a) (2012) (allowing a 20-day grace period to perfect a
purchase money security interest).
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within which reform is practical. To recommend the nature of that
reform requires another step. Researchers must evaluate the alternative functions that have been shown to exist. That evaluation, though
in some respects already under way, is beyond the scope of this
Article.
We nevertheless offer some preliminary observations. Both
secured and unsecured creditors perform the function of lending
money. Whether secured creditors perform some additional function, such as monitoring, remains unclear. Yet the American system
gives secured creditors absolute priority over nearly every other party.
American policymakers did not reason their way to the conclusion that absolute priority was desirable. They adopted it because they
could see no way to avoid it.
The widespread nineteenth century prejudice against the floating
charge was based on a feeling, often inarticulate in the opinions,
that a commercial borrower should not be allowed to encumber all
his assets present and future, and that for the protection not only of
the borrower but of his other creditors a cushion of free assets
should be preserved. That inarticulate premise has much to recommend it. This [a]rticle decisively rejects it not on the ground that it
was wrong in policy but on the ground that it was not effective. In
pre-Code law there was a multiplication of security devices designed
to avoid the policy: field warehousing, trust receipts, factor’s lien
acts and so on. The cushion of free assets was not preserved. In
almost every state it was possible before the Code for the borrower
to give a lien on everything he held or would have. There have no
doubt been sufficient economic reasons for the change. This
[a]rticle, in expressly validating the floating charge, merely recognizes an existing state of things.355

Grant Gilmore, the principal draftsman of Article 9 later
famously asked “does it make any sense to award everything to a
secured party who stands idly by while a doomed enterprise goes
down the slippery slope into bankruptcy?”356
355 U.C.C. § 9-204, cmt. 2 (1994).
356 Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code:
Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REV. 605, 627 (1981). [The floating
charge] is similar in many ways to the scheme contemplated by Benedict, and all of this
suggests that we should be cautious in embracing Article 9’s choice in favor of perfected floating security interests on inventory and receivables without the secured
creditor exercising some control over the collateral. See Picker, supra note 305, at
1185. Other scholars have also noticed that the rule requiring English floating charge
holders to exercise control over their collateral is essentially the same rule the American courts adopted in Benedict v. Ratner, only to be overturned by adoption of the
Uniform Commercial Code. See Segal, supra note 28, at 937–38.
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On the English side, the critique has been even sharper. Addressing the floating charge, the English Cork Report concluded that it “is
capable of working great injustice”357 and “had given rise to a widespread and long-standing sense of grievance in the commercial community.”358 The report continued:
[t]he matter for wonder is that such a device should ever have been
invented by a Court of Equity. It is not easy to discern on what
principle of equity the holder of a floating charge should obtain
security over goods for which his money has not paid, in priority to
the claim of the unpaid supplier of the goods.359

The secured credit carve-outs adopted in England and many
other legal systems360 are the principal response to these perceived
inequities. To the extent it is effective, the English Carve-out solves
the problem of financing the operation of the insolvency system,
insures the employees of payment of at least part of their wages without requiring public funds, and restores more appropriate incentives
to business owners by forcing the maintenance of a “cushion of
assets.”
The question raised by the Article 9 drafters in the comment
cited earlier—whether it is possible to force maintenance of a cushion
of assets—has not been answered. Professor Armour has argued that
the English Carve-out has not made floating lien collateral available to
unsecured creditors, but merely caused debtors to avoid the Carve-out
by selling their accounts receivable rather than by borrowing against
them.361 He charges that “the statutory scheme is an expensive, and
not particularly effective, way of protecting the interests of its ‘beneficiaries[.’]”362 This charge should be a principal focus of future
research.
With respect to the filing system, there seems to be a consensus
that security interests should rank in order of filing and have priority
as of the date of filing. The key policy choice remaining is between
the American view—that security agreements should be private
because the filing system exists only for the benefit of secured creditors and their debtors—and the English view that security agreements
357 Cork Report, ¶ 105.
358 Id. ¶ 106.
359 Id. ¶ 107.
360 See supra note 346.
361 Armour, supra note 337, at 203–05; id. at 204 (noting that “invoice discounting
has grown dramatically over the period since [1999]”); id. at 199–200 (describing
studies showing that banks have reduced their exposure to the English Carve-out by
reducing their reliance on floating liens).
362 Id. at 206.
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should be public because the filing system exists for the benefit of
everyone affected by security interests. We prefer the English view
because it better enables affected parties to adjust to the harsh reality
of secured creditor privilege.
With respect to cramdown, we are inclined toward the American
view. In reorganization in either country, the debtor can, with court
approval, sell the collateral. Thus the debtor can limit the secured
creditor’s recovery to the value of the secured creditor’s collateral,
plus the secured creditor’s pro rata share of the estate with respect to
the uncollateralized portion of its claim. That is the same limit
cramdown imposes on the secured creditor. The virtue of cramdown
is that it strips the secured creditor of its “hold-up” rights. By “hold-up
rights” we mean the right of the secured creditor to veto a plan that
pays the secured creditor as much as the secured creditor would get
through sale. Because such a veto can destroy the value that would
otherwise be available to pay the unsecured creditors, its threat can
enable the secured creditor to demand more than its legal entitlement. In the countries with which we are familiar, insolvency law has
evolved steadily in opposition to secured creditor hold-up rights.363
The American cramdown is simply the logical ending point for that
evolution.
Comparison of legal systems that use sharply different doctrinal
explanations can be difficult. In this Article, we have demonstrated
that the systems approach can provide a solution to this problem in at
least some circumstances. Even the systems with the sharpest doctrinal differences may exhibit surprising similarities in function. Despite
their doctrinal differences, the security systems of England and the
United States function in essentially the same ways. To understand
one of these systems functionally is, in a very real sense, to understand
them both.

363 See, e.g., John Armour et al., Corporate Ownership Structure and the Evolution of
Bankruptcy Law: Lessons from the United Kingdom, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1699, 1738 (2002)
(saying of the pre-2002 administrative receivership regime in England that “[t]he pivotal right a secured creditor has, once there has been a default, is a license to seize
and sell the security to satisfy the amount owed”); LoPucki & Triantis, supra note 27,
at 277 (“The CCAA scheme of reorganization became more popular than reorganization under the Canadian Bankruptcy Act because it was capable of binding secured
creditors.”).
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